College of William & Mary Law School

William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository
Congressional Testimony

Faculty and Deans

1987

Master Limited Partnerships: Hearings before the
Subcommittee on Select Revenue Measures of the
Committee on Ways and Means, House of
Representatives, One Hundredth Congress, First
Session
Charles B. Rangel
Raymond J. McGrath
Michael A. Andrews
Judd Gregg
Byron L. Dorgan
See next page for additional authors

Repository Citation
Rangel, Charles B.; McGrath, Raymond J.; Andrews, Michael A.; Gregg, Judd; Dorgan, Byron L.; Brown, Hank; Kennelly, Barbara B.;
Wilson, James J.; Lee, John W.; Sandler, Lewis; and Rosenthal, Jeff, "Master Limited Partnerships: Hearings before the Subcommittee
on Select Revenue Measures of the Committee on Ways and Means, House of Representatives, One Hundredth Congress, First
Session" (1987). Congressional Testimony. 5.
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/testimony/5

Copyright c 1987 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository.
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/testimony

Authors

Charles B. Rangel, Raymond J. McGrath, Michael A. Andrews, Judd Gregg, Byron L. Dorgan, Hank Brown,
Barbara B. Kennelly, James J. Wilson, John W. Lee, Lewis Sandler, and Jeff Rosenthal

This congressional testimony is available at William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository: https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/
testimony/5

MASTER LIMITED PARTNERSHIPS

HEARINGS
BEFORE 'l'HE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON
SELECT REVENUE MEASURES
OF THE

COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVE'S
ONE HUNDREDTH CONGRESS '
FIRST SF13SION
JUNE 30; JULY 1, 1987

Serial 100-39
Printed for the use of Committee on Ways and Means

U.I. OOVDNIIDfT PRINTING
81-926

omca

WAlHINGTON : 1988

'til ....

by the SuperinteDdtn~ of Document.. ~ Sal.

U.s. Ocwernmeat Prifttinl Oft\oe, WMhiDIton. DC ICM02

omc.

COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS
DAN ROSTENKOWSKI, Illinois, Chairman
SAM M. GIBBONS, Florida
JOHN J. DUNCAN, Tennessee
J.J. PICKLE, Texas
BILL ARCHER, Texas
CHARLES B. RANGEL, New York
GUY VANDER JAGT, Michigan
FORTNEY H. (PETE) STARK, California
PHILIP M. CRANE, Illinois
ANDY JACOBS, JR., Indiana
BILL FRENZEL, Minnesota
HAROLD FORD, Tennessee
DICK SCHULZE, Pennsylvania
ED JENKINS, Georgia
BILL GRADISON, Ohio
RICHARD A. GEPHARDT, Missouri
WILLIAM M. THOMAS, California
THOMAS .J. DOWNEY, New York
RAYMOND J. McGRATH, New York
HAL DAUB, Nebraska
FRANK J. GUARINI, New Jersey
MARTY RUSSO, Illinois
JUDD GREGG, New Hampshire
HANK BROWN, Colorado
DONALD J. PEASE, Ohio
ROBERT T. MATSUI, California
ROD CHANDLER, Washington
BERYL ANTHONY, JR., Arkansas
RONNIE G. FLIPPO, Alabama
BYRON L. DORGAN, North Dakota
BARBARA B. KENNELLY, Connecticut
BRIAN J. OONNELLY, Massachusetts
WILLIAM J. COYNE, Pennsylvania
MICHAEL A. ANDREWS, Texas
SANDER M. LEVIN, Michigan
JIM MOODY, Wisconsin
ROBERT J. LEONARD, Chief Counsel
M . KENNETH BoWLER, Staff Director
A.L. SINGLETON, Minority Chief of Staff

SUBCOMMITTEE ON SELECT REVENUE MEASURES

CHARLES B. RANGEL. New York, Chairman
RONNIE G. FLIPPO. Alabama
GUY VANDER JAGT, Michigan
BYRON L. DORGAN. North Dakota
RAYMOND J . McGRATH, New York
BARBARA B. KENNELLY, Connecticut
JUDD GREGG, New HampshirE!
MICHAEL A. ANDREWS, Texas
HANK BROWN, Colorado
FORTNEY H. (PETE) STARK, California
WILLIAM J. COYNE, Pennsylvania

CONTENTS
Page

Press release announcing the hearings. .... ............ ..... ........... ... ........ ........ ...... .......... ...

2

WITNESSES

U.S. Department of the Treasury, J. Roger Mentz, Assistant Secretary for Tax
Policy ............................................................................................................................. .
American Bar Association, Section of Taxation, John B. Jones, Jr., and Stanley Blend ....................................................................................................................... .
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, Tax Division, Herbert J.
I.A!mer ............................................................................................................................ .
Andrews & Kurth, Barksdale Hortenstine ................................................................ .
Apache Corp., Edwin E. Cain and Michael Valdez .................................................. .
Ballentine, J. Gregory, ENSERCH Corp., Goldman. Sachs & Co., and Merrill
_ Lynch & Co., Inc .......................................................................................................... .
Barber, Alan T., Coopers & Lybrand........................................................................... .

~~~=t:, ='he ~;;'~~~~~~~.~~~~..~.~~.~~~~~.::::::::::::::::::::::::::::

~~~~!imIn~~~sEA6ir&,~::··~i~~:··&~~··&··Q;~:··~d··M~;riii
~i:n~o~~bii~i' .. ~~d~··P~rl~~~hlj;:·J~;··F:·Di~~~::::::::::::::::::::::::::::

Cohen, Richard G., Winthrop, Stimson, Putnam & Roberts .................................. ..
Commonwealth Financial Group, Commonwealth Mortgage of America, L.P.,

c!::n~~!i,hh!~·ii·~~~it:·j~~·S:·Fti~t;·~d·Ai~·T:·~b;;·::::::::::

7

62
68

128
269
256
205

62
269
324
256
159

314
314

205

167

Davis, Christo3lher L., Investment Partnership Association .................................. .
Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., Edward C. OeIsner m ..................................................
Dickason, James F., Coalition for Publicly Traded Partnerships ........................
E.F. Hutton & Co., Inc., William P. Nicoletti ............................................................ .
ENSERCH Corp., John E. Chapoton and J. Gregory Ballentine .......................... ..
E:QK Partners, Myles H. Tanenbaum ........................................................................ ..
Furst, John S., Coopers & Lybrand ............................................................................. .
Goldman, Sachs & Co., John E. Chapoton and J. Gregory Ballentine ................. .
Hortenstine, Barksdale, Andrews & Kurth .............................................................. ..
International Paper Co., John T. Leyden and Mark Capone ................................ ..
Interstate General Co. L.P., James J. Wilson ............................................................ .
Investment P81tnership Association, Christopher L. Davis and William
Morris ............................................................................................................................ .
Jones, John B., Jr., Section of Taxation, American Bar Association .................... .
Kina' & Spalding, William S. McKee and Mark A. Kuller .................................... ..
Kuller, .Mark A., King & Spalding ............................................................................. ..
lAlventhol & Horwath, Rotiert D.""Milbum ............................................. ;................... .
Lee, John W., Marshall-Wythe School of Law, College of William and Mary ... ..
Lerner, Herbert J., Tu Division, American Institute of Certified Public Ac-

128
324
337

I:r~J!~J.;,~=t~~n.,%::~ro~ ~::·T;_··E~~;:gy·C;;::·~. E:;;pi~

324

lAvett. James B., Coopers " Lybrand ........................................................................ ..

205
107

o ..

countant. ..................................................................................................................... ..

ratlonPartnet'l, Ltd.........,.......................................................................................... .

McKee, William S., KIng & SPaldinj[.......................................................................... .
Merrill

L~h

6 Co., Inc., Jolin E. Chapoton and J. Gregory Ballentine ........... ..

Milbum, Hobert D., lAI.venthol " Horwath ............................................................... ..
(III)

211
159
223

256

316
205
256

167
62
107
107

234

340
68

283

256
234

IV
Page

Morris, William, Investment Partnership _Association ............................................ .
National Apartment Association, Lewis H. Sandler ................................................ .
National Association of Realtors, Jeffrey R. Rosenthal .......................................... .
Neafsey, John P., Sun Co., Inc ..................................................................................... .
New York State Bar Association, Tax Section, Donald Schapiro ......................... ..
Nicoletti, William P., E.F. Hutton & Co., Inc ............................................................ .
Oelsner, Edward C., m, Dean Witte.r Reynolds, Inc ................................................ .
Peat Marwick Main & Co., Geo~e J. RobinSon ....................................................... ..
Real Estate Securities and Syndication Institute, Jeffrey R. Rosenthal ............. ..
Robert A. Stanger & Co., Rol>ert A. Stanger ............................................................ ..
Robinson, George J., Peat Marwick Main & Co ........................................................ .
Rosenthal, Jeffrey R., National Association of Real~rs and Real Estate Securities and Syndication Institute............................................................................... ..
Sandler, Lewis H., Southwest Realty Ltd., and National Apartment Association ................................................................................................................................. ..
Schapiro, Donald, Tax Section, New York State Bar Association ......................... .
Southwest Realty Ltd., Lewis H. Sandler.................................................................. ..
Spiegel, Hart H., Brobeck, Phleger & Harrison ....................................................... ..
Stanger, Rol>ert A., Rol>ert A. Stanger & Co ...........................................:................ ..
Sun Co., Inc., John P. Neafsey ..................................................................................... .
Tanenbaum, Myles H., EQK Partners ........................................................................ .

.

Tr~J::w. ~~~~.~~~~~.~~~~ ~::.~.~~~~~~~~~~.:.~~~~~

Turlington, R. Donald, Brown & Wood ....................................................................... .
Valdez, Michael, Apache Corp ...................................................................................... .
Whitehead, R. Dwayne, Commonwealth Mortgage of America, L.P., Commonwealth Financial Group ............................................................................................. .
Wilson, James J., Interstate General~. L.P........................................................... ..

167

353
360
276

79

223

211
241

360

194
241
360
353

79

353

93
194

276

316
283

141
269

314
337

SUBMISSIONS FOR THE RECORD

Arthur Andersen & Co., Richard A. Gordon, statement and attachment ............
Freeport-McMoran, Inc., James R. Moffett, statement .......................................... ..

~~~~op:~=o":a~~~~~~sf:~~~t~~.~~~~.~:.~~~~.?:: ~~~~~~~.:::

..
ServiceMaster Limited Partnership, C. William Polland, statement .................. .
Standard Pacific, L.P., Rol>ert J. St. Lawrence, statement ......................................

378
388

392
395
396

401

MASTER LIMITED PARTNERSHIPS
TUESDAY, JUNE 30, 1987
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
CoMMITrEE ON WAYS AND MEANS,
SUBCOMMITrEE ON SELECT REVENUE MEASURES,

Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:40 a.m., in room
1100, Longworth House Office Building, Hon. Charles B. Rangel
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
[The press rele~ announcing the hearing follows:]

(1)
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Chairman RANGEL. We'll be opening up the hearings, and I
apologize for being late.
Today our subcommittee will continue its series of hearings to
study the treatment of various passthrough entities established
under our tax laws. On June 9, 1986, we held the first series which
was designed to provide a broad overview of tax policy issues affecting passthrough entities, and today and tomorrow we continue to
focus on the issue of master limited partnerships.
The issue of the proper treatment of the so-called MLPs is one
which presents the subcommittee with several policy, revenue and
technical concerns. From a policy standpoint the tax laws have
treated businesses conducted as partnerships differently from those
conducted as corporations. Whether the master limited partnership
form blurs the distinction between partnership or corporate forms
and whether the MLPs form conform with sound tax policy are serious questions that we will be considering today and tomorrow.
With respect to the revenue concerns, the staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation has not provided us yet with an estimate of the
impact of the master limited partnership activities or on anticipated corporate revenue receipts. We will be very interested in testimony from today's and tomorrow's witnesses which will assist the
subcommittee and the staff in determining the revenue impact of
this form of business activity. We will look forward to receiving testimony regarding technical and compliance issues relevant to the
proper treatment of the master limited partnership. The problems
involved in record keeping and the ability to insure proper compli,ance are ?~ great interest to this ~ommi~~.
.
. . In additIon we expect to receive testImony regarding the question of whether certain technical requirements and elections contained in the partnership rules can be properly applied with respect to the master limited partnership.
We look forward to an indepth analysis of these issues today and
tomorrow. In order to facilitate our consideration to allow us sufficient time to question witnesses, I would ask that the witnesses,
with the exception of the Treasury, to summarize their testimony
in a five minute period with the assurances that their entire printed testimony will appear in the record. And I will ask our clerk to
make certain that the proper electronic signals are given so that it
would advise the witnesses of the remaining time.
I ask that the press release announcing today's hearings be made
a part of the record.
Chairman RANGEL. And now it is my distinct pleasure to welcome a fellow New Yorker and a distinguished member of the administration~ the Honorable J. Roger Mentz, Assistant Secretary
for Tax Policy of the Department of the Treasury.
And before I proceed, I would ask whether or not any member
wishes to make an opening statement.
Mr. McGrath?
Mr. McGRATH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I have received an inordinate amount of concern regarding this
hearing~ and I think as we see the crowd assembled in the hearing
room today, we can understand-Chairman RANGBL. It's not welfare reform.
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Mr. McGRATH. This is right-that there are some interJting
issues that lie before us here.
I was interested in your comments in your opening statement
that the Joint Committee has yet to give us revenue estimates or
tell us whether there' are any .revenue. increases in this at· all. And
if it is your opinion· that· there·"may not be any revenues in this,
then I suggest we.adjourn.. .
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman RANGEL. Mr. Andrews?
Mr. ANDREWS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I am delighted, Mr. Chairman, that this is not welfare reform we
are descussing this morning.
I think it is appropriate that our committee examine this issue
very, ve~ carefully. I think it is something that the staff and all of
us should look at over the coming months. I think it is important,
however, as we examine the witnesses and study the documents
that we recognize that the tax reform bill was really enacted only a
few short months ago. Many provisions that became effective in
January 1987 are still working their way through the marketplace.
If we are to examine adequately the impact of the tax bill, I think
we need more·time to do so.
One of the things I hear from my constituents is to leave the
code alone; let the marketplace work its will to see what the longrange and short-range effects and consequences of this tax bill ~rill
mean to the marketplace.
. As we are aware, master limited partnerships are really ; tither
new form of pass-through entity. The first MLP was form in the
early 1980's. There are several different -kinds of MLP~ that we will
talk about today: rollouts, rollups, liquidations.
- I think it is important that we ask why did these corporations set
. up MLPs in the first place. Was it for. tax avoi ence? Or were there
other reasons just even more significant?
I know that the energy- companies· most of the producing
states, for example, use MLPs to raise l:tlpital for energy exploration and drilling. Many of them would literally have ground to a
standstill without this important vehicle. At a time when the industry is already depressed and imports are on the rise, we need to
888eS8 the long-range impact any action we take may have on oil
and gas exploration and development.
In additIon, the real estate industl1 has traditionally used the
partnership form to raise capital. This industry is also depressed
not onI, in Texas but nationwide as a result of market factOrs coupled WIth the retroactive treatment of real estate activities under
the paaaive 1 rules.
I rec
ize that there is concern about the so-called disincorporatio uf
erica. And I know Mr. Mentz will address this particular
ue.

We Ihould esamine also though how all corporations raise inveatment capital today and whether the investment income is subje¢ to Ingle or double taxation. I urge the committee to examine
what is re811y g9inl on in the marketplace as a result of the 1986
tax chan,. and caution against any further changes' that might
add to the crippling of the oil and gas and real estate industries in
thil country,
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Mr. Chairman, I look forward to the hearings this week.
Chairman RANGEL. Are there any further statements?
Mr. GREGG. Mr. Chairman, I would like to echo the concerns
raised by my colleagues from Texas and New York. Not ~ coming
from either of those States which have a much more intimate involvement with the operative aspects of MLPs, I, however, do have
genuine concern. And my concenl is that no matter what we do in
this area, I don't think we're going to impact only the master limited partnerships. We are going to impact all limited partnerships if
we attempt to go down a legislative road.
And as a small town tax practitioner, I always found it exceptionally frustrating that the Treasury Department never did issue
regulations or rather only for 48 hours issued regulations on trying
to derme this area. And it was always very difficult to practice in
this area because of the Treasury Department's sort of ax that they
held over our heads by not adequately outlining what was and
wasn't a partnership.
~
But if we are going to move into this area, I think we have to
acknowledge that we are going to impact all forms of partnerships
not just master limited partnerships. The scope of this hearing or
any legislation in this area is much broader than just these unique
vehicles because any legislation I suspect is not going to be able to
be drafted narrowly enough to just impact those vehicles.
Second, I fought very hard in opposition to the repeal of the General Utilities doctrine when we were marking up the tax bill in
1986. I think it was a major mistake to repeal that doctrine. I don't
think that we should start penalizing corporations which are trying
to plan effectively in light of that repeal and trying to do what the
General Utilities doctrine allowed peopl2 to do prior to the 1986
law . because I personally feel that that was an appropriate approach anyway. And so, I think one of the things that IS causing : ,
momentum in this area is an improper consideration, and that's
the fact that people are trying to get around the repeal of the General Utilities doctrine.
Third, it seems to me that as a very practical matter that any~ .
thing we do in this area will be arbitrary, that whatever number
we pick or whatever way we decide to derme what partnerships
are, it's going to be an arbitrary decision. And if we're going to
make arbitrary .decisions legislatively, I think that's a mistake. I
would rather have the marketplace drive those decisions than the
r~1atory effort.
.
Chairman RANGEL. If there is no-Mr. Dorgan?
Mr. DoRGAN. Well, Mr. Chairman, following up on those remarks, I ,t hink it is fair to say most of us don't know the difference
betw~n an MLP and a four-bottom plow. This is .a .new area with
consequences most of us don't understand or probably recognize. I
think that most of us are concerned about what is being pro~
and what the impact of it would be. I think it is fair to say 1 don't
have any ~econceived notions about what we ought to do, but I am
concerned about what is being proposed andwh8t impact it mifht
have on general partnership taxation. I am interested in learning
exactly what is liappening out in the marketplace and what that
might suggest for action or no action on behalf of this committee.
Chairman RANGEL. I recognize the gentleman.
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Mr. BROWN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to commend the chairman for bringing this matter before
ua, and following up on it. I think" is a vitally important area,
one that deserves and merita our attention. And I want to commend the Treasury for taking a look at this area aa well.
This particular discuaaion with regard to MLPs involves, I think,
one of the most remarkable turnarounds in such a brief period of
time that I have ever seen in the tax law. Lese than a year ago,
Treasury's position waa that this would not have a significant
impact; that is, for the first time in more than a half a century
having the corporate rate being higher than the top personal rate
would not lead to disincorporation, would not lead to a DIl\ior loss
of revenue in this area. If I understand the Treasury's current position, it is that it could well have a significant impact.
I think it is appropriate to look at this. The relative rates with
regard to corporations and individuals I think will result in some
changes. I was disappointed that that waa not recognized when the
tax bill dealt with it. I think it is appropriate to take a look at that
area again.
I hope, aa we look at it, we will try and make some sense out of
the way we treat these trustee entities or nontaxable entities or
partnerships, whether we call them MLPs or even look at a subchapter S. To focua only on free transferability I suapect gives ua
some problems with consistency. We obviously have transferability
of ownership in a subchapter S along with the flowthrough concept. Hopefully we will not be about making up a myriad of special
entities with special rules, but that the product of our work will be
BOme consistent treatment of these flowthrough entities that makes
it not only rational and reasonable for 8 practitioner to work in
this area, but provides some equity in the way we treat individuals
who choose to organize and conduct buainess.
Chairman RANGEL. Mr. Mentz, is it sound tax policy and are we
losing money?
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AFTERNOON SESSION

Mrs. KENNELLY. Thank you. We are going to reconvene the Subcommittee on Select Revenue Measures on the issue of master limited partnerships.
I welcome the next panel, James J. Wilson, president and chief
executive officer of Interstate General Co., L.P., John Lee of the
College of William and Mary,- and Lewis Sandler of the National
Apartment Association, also Mr. Jeff Rosenthal of the National Association of Realtors.
Thank_you. We will proceed as we did this morning.
Mr. Wilson, if you will start, the other witnesses will testify and
then we will have questions.
STATEMENT OF JAMES J. WILSON, PRESIDENT AND CHIEF
EXECUTIVE OFFICER, INTERSTATE,_GENERAL CO., L.P.

Mr. WILSON. I have handed in a prepared text and I will not
bother you with reading from it.
Mrs. KENNELLY. It will be put in the record, sir.
Mr. WILSON. My name is James J, Wilson. I am president and
CEO of Interstate General Co. Our company is in the real estate
development and building business.
I started the company 30 years ago. We operated during those 30
years in four areas of the real estate business: development, home
building, apartment construction, and apartment management.
During those 30 years we operated as a partnership. Some of our
entities were subchapter S corporations, and we were the sponsors
of approximately 30 partnerships that raised money for low and
moderate income housing.
Today the company owns approximately 8,000 apartment units
for low and moderate income families, and is continuing in that
line of business.
!
In 1983-84 it was clear that our company was going to be required to raise additional equity capital if we were to continue in
our line of business. At that time, being a partnership, there was a
great deal of research by our attorneys as to the problems of raising equity in a partnership. We deferred doing it because the appropriate congressional committees were investigating the very
question that we are now here today to discuss,' and that is the difference between a private partnership and a public partnership.
It had been the Treasury's position for many years that a public
partnership is, in fact, a corporation and should be taxed as a corporation. Because of that cloud, there wasn't a lot of activity in
selling public units in a partnership.
However, the Congress, in its wisdom, during a 2-year period did
research and came to a conclusion which culminated in the recently enacted Tax Act that they should not tax public partnerships.
As a result, in Februaty our company signed an underwriting
agreement with a gt"oup of investment bankers and sold 20 percent
of our units to public unit holders and raised approximately $20
million of equity capital which went into the enterprise and paid
off our short-term bank debt.
The question that is being considered here today is basically
whether the Congress, in the two years of deliberations concerning
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partnerships, made a mistake in their deliberations or whether
there are some new facts which would have changed their decision,
had they known them.
I submit to you the following: The question of taxing partnerships was well researched and the conclusion was reached that the
changes in the tax law which implemented the repeal of General
Utilities, doctrine and addressed the question of passive income,
and those two items would effectively prevent the so-called massive
flow of monies away .from the Treasury in the form of loss of tax
revenue.
.
Now I will comment on one last issue, and that is the patently
unfair position of the Treasury that because a partnership has
public shareholders it should be taxed-a double tax, in effect-and
I submit to you the following: If our company were to be subject to
a double tax, I think the members of this committee would realize
very simply that it would be in the best interest of the 80 percent
holders, of which I am 60 percent, that it would not be a good judgment to keep the public shareholders.
So by the simple expedient of taking them out of the enterprise,
we now go back to a singly ta"ted entity and, as a result, the Treasury is not going to get any additional income out of it. But what
they have done is squeezed out the small public stockholder.
I would like to remind the committee that the last tax bill did
pave a provision to encourage John Q. Public to become owners of
partnerships, because of the passive income provision, and we now
are talking about a provision today that possibly could be adopted
that would eliminate the only vehicle in which the small public investor could participate.
Thank you.
[The statement of Mr. Wilson follows:]
STATEMENT BY JAMES J. WWK>N, PREsIDENT AND CHIEF
INTERSTATE GENERAL Co., L.P.

ExEcurtw

OwICER OF

My name is James J. Wilson. I am president and chief executive officer of Interstate General Co., L.P., ("Interstate General").
Interstate General is a Delaware limited partnership organized on December 31,
1986. Approximately 20 percent of its outstanding units are held by the public and
traded on the American Stock F..xchange.
Interstate General engages in four related real estate activities: community development, home building, development and ownership of rental apartments, and management services. Interstate General is the developer of, and a reading home builder
in, the planned community of St. Charles, Maryland. St Charles is located 23 miles
southeast of Washington, D.C. and consists of 9,100-acre development. Interstate
General manages and has general partner interests in 30 apartment projects with a
total of approximately 7,000 rental units. The market Interstate General serves is
primarily entry level housing and multifamily housing for low income and elderly
families.
This subcommittee will hear from economists and tax theorists on the issue that
it has before it today. I am an engineer by training and a businessman with over 30
years experience in real estate construction, development, and management. I wish
to address the practical side of publicly traded partnerships and to relate to you
what I consider to be a success story for the economy that is due, in part, to the
availability of publicly traded partnerships 88 a vehicle for raising capital.
Interstate General's predecessor companies were owned approximately 60 percent
by me and my family and 40 percent oy various employees, former employees, and
parties who had acquired interests 88 a result of busmess relations with the companies or personal contracts with me. Prior to the formation of Interstate General, the
busineues now conducted by Interstate General attracted equity capital in various
ways.
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Initially, the predecessor companies were involved in the construction of relatively well-defmed projet.1;s such as a single apartment project, a shopping center, or a
commercial building. Equity capital for these projects was generally raised through
limited partner contributions, principally by weahhy individuals or family investment companies. Minimum capital contributions of over $200,000 were typical.
Notwithstanding the size of the individual contributions, the amount of equity
raised was generally limited. Also, the equity was limited to a single project and
was not available to be used for business opportunities as they became available
from time to time.
In 1976, a predecessor company to Interstate General (HISC") needed to raise capital to continue the development of St. Charles, a planned Department of Housing
and Urban Development community. Again, the 'vehicle used to attract equity capital for the development was a limited partnership. The additional equity raised for
the development was $3.5 million. This was not sufficient to withstand the inevitable downturns in the cyclical real estate development business. There was no ready
means of increasing the equity base utilizing the closely held limited partnership.
For these reasons, we were forced into a debt restructuring with the Department of
Housing and Urban Development early in 1983. After the restructuring business
conditions improved and ISC was able to repay its remaining loans to HUD and
raise limited amounts of capital through joint ventures, principally with financial
institutions.
Notwithstanding these sources of capital, our business judgment was that our operations were still overly exposed to cyclical business downturns and that the cost of
equity capital raised through joint ventures was higher than that available through
public capital markets. Possibilities for tapping puolic markets included utilizing a
corporation to issue shares to the public or using a partnership and admitting the
public as limited partners to the partnership.
We determined that potential investors would view an investment in our business
as an investment in our assets and would want to be assured of a return as the
value of these assets was realized. For this reason, we decided to proceed with a
public offering of limited partnership units.
Throughout this time, we closely .followed legislative developments regarding the
taxation of publicly held partnerships. We concluded that Congress after susbstantial attention had determined that publicly held partnerships would be taxed as
pass through vehicles. In reliance on this and the fact that such partnerships were
clearly allowed under existing law, Interstate General was organized and its units
issued to the public at a price of $9 a unit. Two million, two hundred thousand units
were sold to primarily n.on-institutional unitholders. We now have public investors
who have invested a total of approximately $20,000,000 in Interstate General. This
capital has given Interstate General the equity it needs to continue to provide housing for those markets most in need of new housing stock~~jfj level single-family
homes and multifamily housing for low income and elderly Ii ..es.
Based on this experience, I have the following observations:
(1) Publicly traded"partnerships will not result in the disincorporation of American business. The repeal of the General Utilities doctrine places a tax cost on liquidation that would, in most cases, never be recovered by the tax savings from operating in the partnership form. Since Interstate General was organized we have considered acquisitions of companies followed by their liquidation and have rejected this
88 a viable approach. Also, most business that intend to reinvest their earnings will
not choose the partnenhip form of doing business since substantial distributions
would have to be made to the partners to cover, at a minimum, their tax liability.
(2) Partnerships
ve 10Df been available as an investment mechanism for
wealthy individuals to acquire professionally managed aaaets. This opportunity
should not be limited to the wealthy, but should be available to all Americans. The
only suitable vehicle for such investments is the publicly traded partnership.
(3) It is unlikelr t hat any substantial revenue would be gaineCl by taxing publicly
traded partnerships
corporations. As noted above, it is unlikely that many exist-iDf corporations will convert to partnerships. The liquidation spurt of 1986 is not
bemg repeated in 1987. As this committee knows, the liquidation of a large number
of corporations in 1986 to avoid the burden of the repeal of General Utilities produced unexpectedly large tax revenues. Furthermore, economic activity that would
generate revenue woulcf be curtailed if the publicly traded partnership vehicle were
not available.
.
(4) Any action taken by the Congress to curtail the availability of publicly traded
limited partnerships ould not appl)' to existing publicly traded ~enhlPl. Expected revenues from ch action would be greatfy reduced or eliminated. The likely
outcome will be that public investol'8 will be eliminated through leveraged buyouts
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at (!iscount prices reflecting the reduced value of their investment when subjected
to double taxation . Once again the small investor would be dented the tax advantage offered to the wealthy investor.
{5) The use of a public partnership can not be equated with a public corporation
for tax purposes under existing law. It carries its burdens as well as its benefits e.g.,
pensi.on funds. tax-exempt entities and individi ual retirement accounts are unlikely
public partnership investors because of the tax on unrelated trade or business
income. Moreover, partnerships are dist.inctive in that partnership agreements may
be structured in ways that corporate charters may not. In this regard, one notable
ditTerence is that a partnership agreement may require distributions in certain circumstances. for example, a sale of certain assets. By contrast, corporate distributions are at the discretion of the board of directors.
(6) Congress should not change the ground rules so soon after enacting the comprehensive Tax Reform Act of 1986. More time is needed to study the practical
impact of publicly traded partnerships on the economy in conjunction with lower
corporate and individual tax rates . .In the long run, I expect that pub!icly traded
partnerships will be an important asset for our nation's economy allowing asset
based businesses to compete for capital with service and other non-asset based busine.sses. Congress should not take action to eliminate this asset based on ivory tower
tax theory or on revenue projections that will never materialize.
It is my hope that what I have outlined above will provide this subcommittee
some practical insight into tHe real world problems that make the publicly traded
partnership vehicle a desirable form of doing business for our economy. To summarize, I believe that the publicly traded limited partnership vehicle is desirable to
enable asset-based businesses access to equity capital at reasonable costs.

Mrs.

KENNELLY.

Mr. Lee.

STATEMENT OF JOHN W. LEE, PROFESSOR OF LAW, MARSHALLWYTHE SCHOOL OF LAW, COI~LEGE OF WILLIAM AND MA~Y

Mr. LEE. Thank you.
I am John Lee, a law professor at the College of William and
Mary. I sort of reverse McKee's pattern. I have 13 yearJ of practice
and then I taught for 6 years. He was 13 years teaching and now is
in practice. And I think we come at things frOID a different perspective.
We have heard a lot of talk about policy but I am not sure we
have seen a lot of policy. If we look at classification criteria that
are in the current 7700 regulations, we see under a deep structure
analysis that the only logical difference is between an aggregate
approach and a separate entity approach.
An aggregate approach tries to treat the partner just as if he
owned the property directly. An entity approach says you own an
interest in the entity only. Assistant Secretary Mentz would say
once you have a separate entity, you have got to tax it as a separate entity.
That doesn't follow. It is a different policy question as to whether
the separate entity flows through or is taxed separately. The S corporation, it flows through; look at the C corporation, it does not.
When we begin to look at trying to distinguish between those entities that are like aggregates and those that are not, factors like
public trading overlap the policy factors. Yet, if you have public
trading most partners do not participate. At the same time, however, you can have a partnership in which most people don't participate, in which there is no public trading, and therefore the public
trading is too narrow a line.
If what you are seeking to distinguish is between ~gregate and
entitx, the line should focus on something like "matenal participation,' something like being in there as a partner doing things.
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Probably in some small, for example, 15-person, perhaps only general, partnership you could have inactive partners that should
.
have aggregate treatment.
When you look at current corporations, S corporations, partnerships, MLPs, what I think you see is that the MLPs and the large
partnerships "Nould fall on the separate entity side. Small C's
would fallon the aggregate side.
It was frequently raised by McKee and others, should we tax the
two-man partnership like the two-man corporation. That is the ·
wrong end of the telescope. The proper question is s1:· _~d we tax
the two-man corporation like the two-man partnership, and the
answer is yes.
A small corporation in which everybody materially participates
should not be able to use the 15 percent inside graduated corporate
bracket versus the 28 percent or phantom 33 individual brackets,
that would apply in direct taxation.
Joint committee and Treasury told us in the 1985-86 reform
there was no tax policy for those graduated close C brackets. If you
are looking for revenue, there may be some there. There is a universe of 4 million corporations. We now have about a million 8's, I
think. I don't know what the number is for large C's-surely no
more than 500,000. There are I1f2 million corporations with no
incOl.le at all. That leaves a million closely held C's that are using
the j.nside brackets. If all were using them to the maximum, it would be $5,000 per
corporation, assuming 15 percent versus 28 percent-$5,000 and
change. If there is a million times $5,000, that comes to $5 billion.
That number is probably high. But there are surely $1 to $5 billion
out there per year.
There is no real reason for that subsidy being there besides political ways to encourage capital formation. In my experience in practice, the owners took out the salary they needed to live O!l, then
left in in the old days $25,000 to use the low brackets. It was
simply a pocketbook to put the money in. There are things that are
supposed to stop it, but they don't really.
So if we are going to be logical, we should do something like,
where you are actually in there working, if you are, then you must
be taxed directly; if you are not, we can have a separate entity, and
that leads to the second question of what do we do with the MLP's.
Parenthetically, I think we w'o uld be doing the close C's a favor
to make them pass through their income. People would use them
for that $5,000 of tax saving a year. Yet what they run into are the
accumulated earnings, perhaps personal holding company, unreasonable comp problems-I have a laundry list in my statement of
the problems that come up--and General Utilities repeal, so when
they sell the business they will have a double tax. As a result,
many have gone to the S's-all should go 8-or something like it.
As to the large limited partnerships and the MLPs where the
people do not materially participate, they should be limited to an
entity approach, which means if we .allow them to pass through
income and loss, that is all they do. If they sell the interest, it is
simply selling an interest. It is not like they sold the assets as
under the aggregate approach. If someone buys, it is not like they
have bought the assets as under the (elective) aggregate approach.
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Many of the problems in administration as to MLP's come from
attempting to use aggregate tools, allocation, and so forth, in an
entity context.
As to integration, what it really comes down to-and people have
talked quite a bit about subjecting these various entities to double
taxes-is away from neutrality. The reality is what was decided in
1986 is that if you have active income, passive investor, that is
largely held by high income individuals and tax exempts, they
really don't carry their share, in my view, and therefore the tax on
the corporations was to do that.
So we have a concept of schedular income. If it is active income
passive investor, then it has to carry that corporate sector tax load.
That tax load is not 34 percent. The corporate tax load is about 22
percent of economic income. There is not double taxation, because
they don't payout the dividends that much. It is maybe 10, 17 percent, so you can figure out what the revenue estimators have projected would come from the C sector per $100,000 of income as to
annual realization by dividend or sale by the owners of the stock.
Whatever that rate works out to be, that is the rate-plus the
base 22 percent-that should apply to the econom!c income of the
MLP if you let it pass it through. My guess is the total rate would
work out to be something like 28 percent of economic income.
I am saying, let MLP's pass it through but the owners will be
forced into a corporate minimum tax situation and some extra load
for the fact that there would have been dividends at a small level
had the MLP been a corporation, taxed at 28 percent. That would
be revenue neutral because that schedular approach is the only
thing that gives us horizontal equity-all of that type income is
taxed the same. All income that is active with a passive investor
should be taxed the same. And with that we will come closer to
vertical equity, which is ability to pay. The people that own that
income have the ability to pay and therefore it should be carried
there.
My final point is if you are going to do this on policy, the only
policy is something like material participation or pick some
number, and I suspect the biggest gaming is in the close C area,
not in the MLP area, and I suspect in practice the biggest gaming
is the companies too big to go S, that instead do limited partnerships with their owners, various things.
On the 10th page of my statement, I point out some of the things
I suspect go on there.
Thank you.
[The statement of Mr. Lee follows:]
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Statement of John W. Lee
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee
My name is John W. Lee. I am a Professor of Law lit the College of William 8fld
Mary where I have taught tax' law for the past six years; previously I practiced tax law
for II years in a medium size practice specializing in tax planning for small businesses
(cla;e C and S corporations), and in the early 1970's in partnership real estate tax shelter
issues. I do not currently consult and while work on this stlltement was funded by the
Marshall-Wythe Foundation and Alumni Fund, I am representing my own views today.

I. ENTrry CLASSIFICATION
A.

Multi-factor Cocporate Resemblance Approach

Traditionally most authorities formulate the classification issue-in terms of
passthrough entity versus separate (i.e., separately taxable) entity, ~ Treas. Reg.
S 301.7701-2; Hearings on Issues Related to Pass through Entities before the
Subcommittee on Select Revenue Measures of the lIo16e COO1mittee on Ways S'ld Mean~
99th Congo 2d Sess. 8 (986) (Ass't Sec'ty Mentz) ("Passthrough Hearings"). However,
under a deep structure analysis the only universaUy valid funetional classification
distinction is between an aggregate approach and a separate entity approach (net
necessarily as a separate taxpayer). FlI'therm<re, the only determinative policy-based
classific8tion criterion is the owner's relationship to the bwiness. The four traditional
Mocrissey factors (continuity of life, centralized management. limi ted liability. and free
transferability), overly and short-sightedly mechanized by the cll'rent "Kintner"
regulations, see Note, Tax Classification of Limited Partnerships, 90 lIarv. L. Rev. 745,
750 (1977); Note, Tax Classification of Limited Partnerships: The IRS Bombards Tax
Shelters, 52 N. Y.U.L. Rev. 405, 424-40 (I977), with the preponderance test's " thumb upon
the scales" in favor of partnership status, Larson v. Commissiooer, 66 T.C. 159, 185
(1976), only obliquely touch upon this relationship: essentially whether the owner
actively or materially participates or is only a passive investor.
Under a deep structure analysis, material participation (or perhaps acting as the
money person in a very small venture, say 15 general partners or tIlder the Service's
upper benchmark for aggregate audit, Cf. Hearings on President's 1978 Tax P~salS
before the H016e Committee on wafn and Means, 95th ConC.2d Sess. 5835-361918).
(statement of Commissioner Kurtz) "1978 H013e Hearings"» is the sine qua non of
"aggregate" treatment. For as the 1984 enactment Of S 707(a)(2) reaffirmed the
hallmark of an entrepreneur is material participation and ent!'epreneuriai risk as to
paymentj under the aggregate aperoach the owner is treated as near as possible as _
individual entrepreneur apart from the partnership, S. Rep. No. 1622, 83d Cone. 2d Sess.
99 (1954); Lane, Sol Diamond: Jhe Tax Court Upsets the Service Partner, 46 So. Cal. L.
Rev. 239, 253~ 1 (973); ~ Pratt v. Commissioner. 550 F.2d 1023, 1026 (5th Cir. 1977);
Deptt of Treasury, The President's 1978 Tax Program 118 (January 30, 1918). re~nted in
1978 House Hearings, 95th Congo 2d Sess. 271 U918}; cr. Joint C ommittee Star7General
Explanation of the Revenue Provisions of the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, 98th Congo
2d Sess. 238 (1984); Holiday Village Shopping Center, Inc. v. United States, 113 F.2d 276,
282 '.Fed. Cir. 1985). The quintessential individual entreprene&rial charaeteristic is such
material participation. Ideally the aggregate approach applies in virtually all aspects
except audi t, reporting and ~ characterization of ineome. In contrast, tIlder the
entity approach the taxpayer is not treated as having any inside interest in the entity's
assets, only an interest in the entity. See Holiday Village Shopping Center. Inc. v. United
States. 5 CL Ct. 566, 570 (Ct. Ct. 198if,8rrd '113 F.2d 276,~. A pass through in
such an entity is limited to a pro rata share 01 income and loss and tax-free withdrawal
of investment and retained earnings and no m<re, J:!:., essentially Treasury's preferrt!rl
approach to Subchapters K and S, see Passthrough Hearings, supra at 15-16, 36. These
traditional classification criteria do not speak in any way to whether tile entity should be
taxed separately or should passthrough its incomelloss and permit tax-free withdrawal of
investment and earnings. Whether an entity should be able to passthrough poses different
policy questions discussed below.
The case-l&w matrix, which existing corporate resemblance regulations
mechanized, rests upon the franchise privilege-benefit rationale Cor corporate taxation.
Compare Mcrrissey v. Commissioner, 296 U.s. 344, 359 (1935) with Flint v. Stone Tracy
~ 220 U.s. 107, 162 091 D, and corresponds in large part with Congress' early
understMding of the business purposes for incorporation Oimited liability and eontinuity
of life), Scallen, Federal Income Taxation of Professional AssociatiorB and Corporations,
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49 Minn. L. Rev. 603, 613 (1965). Nevertheless, only "centralized management," as
reinterpreted in the June 1986 Passthrough Entity Hearing Pamphlet, Joint Committee
Staff, Federal Income Tax Treatment of Pass-Through Entities, 99th Congo 2d Sess 13
(1986), of the 4 factors functionally corresponds with the deep structure policy of basing
aggregate passthrough treatment on entreprenetr activities. Renection on large service
partnerships proves this point. Conversely, commentators and witnesses at various hearings have argued that most, if not all, of the 4 traditional corporate advantages and
hence characteristics are functionally in faet usually not available to a close corporation
and its owners, Passthrough Hearings, supra at 19, 28\ASs't Sec'ty Mentz); Id. at 43,51
(McKee & Keller); which probably constitute approximately 90% of all corporations. I
agree; most t!lose C cor rations exhibit none of Reg. S 301.170 1-2(d)'s fotr corporate
characteristics: 1 continuity of life, 2 centralized management, (3) limited liability,
and (4) free transferability of unit of ownership.
First, notwithstanding the perpetual continuity of a corporate charter, when the
principal dies, the business will terminate or be sold mless management successors have
been or can be soon arranged. See Kessler & Yorio, Choosing the Appropriate Form for
the Small Business, I Corp'n L. Rev. 291, 298 (1978). In close C corporations with very
nai'rowly held stock, key shareholders tend also to constitute the board and key officersa pattern of overlapping positions reaching its extreme 115ually in sole shareholder
operations where complete identity between the board, officers d owners commonly
exists. Thus, centralized management is non-existent in most I(!lose corporations.
Limitation of liability is often a chimera a wel2 for close C's. Significant third party
creditors (except perhaps in real estate venttres) usually require cuarentees by principal
shareholders and their spouses. Passthrough Hearings, supra at 19 (Ass't Sec'ty Mentz);
Kessler & Richmond, Is C Corporation Obsolete for the Smell Business!. 7 Corp'n L. Rev.
293, 294 (1984). Furthermore, an active shareholder may be personally liable for his/ her
own torts in the scope of his/her "employment" and possibly in supervising others.
Kessler & Yorio, ~ at 302-04. Finally, the asets of the corporate business Itself,
always subject to the entity's liabilities, ere orten the principal asset of the
entrepreneur. Free transierability also misses the mark in a clooe C where the real
problem is finding any secondary market at all for minori ty close C stock. Here a (putoption) buy-sell with the corporation and/or co-shareholders and right of first refusal ere
qui te the standard.
Conversely, by skilled drafting most of the big 4 corporate advantages can be
obtained by entities that traditionally have been viewed a partnersljps, particularly
large limi ted partnerships, i.e., over 15 partners, see 1978 1I0115e Hearings (pra at 277.
Until Reg. S 301.770-2(a)(3) instituted (in 1960) the ill-fated prepondeunce more thin 2
out of 4 "corporate" characteristics) test, certainty as to classlfieation Wa5 virtually
impossible. Most suggestions for a multi-factor aPPI"oaeh recreate such Wlcertainty,
particularly the Larson call for de-mechanization. unless the thumb on the scales is
simply reversed to apply a preponderance test as to DOlt-corporate status. But the most
serious defect in the current classification regulations is that the resemblaneecharacteristics multi-factor approach has never been clearly directed at any underlying
identifiable policy, unless certainty in itself is viewed as a policy-as some do indeed
argue. See Passthrough Hearings. supra at 28; Note, S2 N. Y.U.L. Rev. supra at 440.
Commentators have advocated myriad changes to the multi-factor approach,
generally settling on one factor or another as determinative, either Ca) limited liability.
Note, 90 Harv. L. Rev. ~ at 1S7 (personal liability); Keyser, Publicly Traded Limited
Partnershi : The Treasur Fi ts the Wr
War 36th Inst. on Oil ~ Gas Law & Tax'n
10-1, 1-18 - 10-19 1985 recourse liability with substantial general partner); Hyman ~
Hoffman, Partnerships and "Associations": A Policy CritiQU~ of the Morrissey
Regulations. 3 Real Estate Tax'n 311, 381, 391 0976} (State law characterization should
be determinative) (future test should be reasonable one, "s~ating the number of owners
and types of complexities of capital interests••• [permitted for pass through status]");
Postlew;aite, Dutton & Magette, A Critique of the ALls Federal Income Tax Project-Subchapter 1(: Proposals on the Taxation or Partners, 7S Georgetown L.J. 396, 459
(1987); Leonard, A Pragmatic View or Corporate Integration, 3S Tax Notes 889, 891
see Outlaw V. United
(1987); or (b) whether the owners' interests are blicl tr
Stales, 494 F.2d 1376 Ct. CL t cert. denied, 419 U.s. 844 1914f\other ractor); Peel,
De ini lion or a Partnership: New Suggestions on an Old Issue, 1979 Wisconsin L. Rev.
989, 1012-13, 1016 (rough, rule of thumb) (any 3 out of 4 or limited liability plus public
trading); ALI, Federal Income 'fax Project Subchapter K: Proposals on the Taxation of
Partners 392-93 (984). None of these proposals accurately distinguish between an (a)
ftggregate or collection of individuals and (b) an entity. Nor does reworking the relative
weight to be given the 4 traJitional corporate resemblance factors, and including other
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factors, such as public trading, all as suggested by the Tax COlrt in Larson v.
Commissioner, 66 T.C. 159 (1976), promote predicta~i1ity or the underlying policy of
aggregate treatment only for entreprenelr characterlsties.
B.

Proposed Classification Standard: Relationship to the Entity's Business

Both the Treasury position at the Pass-TIrough Hearings last Summer and the
accompanying Hearing Pamphlet attempt to base ~ttw'ough treatment on the
"relationship between the entity and its owner," Passtlrough Heari')P • .!!!1!:!. at 11; PassThrough Hearing Pamphlet. supra at 13-14. However, only lack or mvolvement in
management or operation corresponds with the underlying policy ot requiring s eparate
entity statLB where most owners do not actively participate. !t substantially aU of them
are not involved in the entity's management or aperations, no functional basis for an
aggregate approach exists; policy thus calls for an entity approach. Conceivably, albeit
not unlikely, an entity with a large number of owners and publicly traded ownership
interests may hawe a large number of owners involved in the m. .,ement or operations.
More signiticanUy the absence of these factors does not parantee material
participation. Thus, Treasury's publicly traded standard is clearly too narrow leaving
undisturbed, (a) the more serioLB debt backdoor int.ation, ~ Canellas, Corporate Tax
Integration: By Design or By Default, 35 Tax Notes 999, 1002, 1007 (1981); Leon ..d, ~
Pragmatic View of Corporate Integration, 35 Tax Notes 889, 890, • (1911), and (b)
gamesmanship in a close, but large C with "spin off,.. through lqe non-pubUcly traded
limited partnerships, which functionally resemble MLP's and large C corporations. See
Hearings on Reform of Corporate Taxation Before the Senate Committee on Finance,
98th Congo 1st. Sess. 160,365,375 (983) (Statements of John S. Nolan, Southwest
Realty, and Timber Realization) ("Senate Subchapter C Hearlnp"). This Treaswy Slrely
added the frequent change of ownership and aeeess to capital m..kets factors j.at in
order to narrow the targeted group effectively to master limited partnerships, and not all
large limited partnerships. Former Assistant Secret..y for To: Policy Ron Pearlman
!»elieves that publicly traded interests indicates corporat~ status but is not be
determinative. See Sheppard, Rethinkin, Limited PartnersNp Taxation, 30 Tax Notes
877,879 (1986). In the past Treas...y hasfCPpOSed such a pieeemeal approach to
classification. See Senate Subchapter C Hemlll!, sup-a at II, 14-15 (Pearlman>; Cf.
1984 House Tax Shelter Hearings. !!!I!:!. at 40 (Asalt Sec'ty Jobl Eo Chapoton). But see
Dep't Treasury President's 1918 Tax Procram at 117-20 (1978), reprinted in 1918 House
Hearings, supra at 276-79.
•
While publicly traded interest practically mUllS h t the majority of the owners
do not materially participate, and hence should be limited to an entity relationshipi the
same cannot be said about the other single classification factor CW'ralUy advocated,
namely limited liability. An entity in which substantially all of the owners materially
participate in the business could have nonrecourse financing, or more likely not have any
substantial debt, e.g., a service organizatio~ and ins.ance against all substantial risks.
Indeed Congress itself in § 469 recognized that liability and material participation were
not synonymous. "The distinction that the Committee believes should be &-awn between
activities on the bas!s of material participation bears no relations!lip to the question of
whether, and to what extent, the taxpeyer is at risk with respect to the activities." S.
Rep. No. 313, 99th COllg. 2d Sess. 717 (386). Ma"eovEr, the absmce or presence of
liability does not address the underlying awegate issues. Comp8'e Id at 717 11.6.
In fact, a functional aggregate analysis could readily use the new "material
participation" standards of S 469 as a starting point in determi ....C whether the entity
should be treated as an aggregate ~r its owners. The "material participation" standard
also looks at the relationship of the owner to the activity of the entity. "The relationship
to an activity of an investor who does not materially participate may be little differalt
rrom the relationship of a shareholder to a corporation. R S. Rep. No. 313, supra. The
actual approach probably should not track the detailed rule after detailed rule applied to
passive activity losses. For example, the automatic PAL exclusion of real estate from
matec-ial participation, except in narrow circumstances, probably is inappropriate.
Conversely, II miled partnership status, regardless of public tracing. fwad.onally appears
an interest that does not materially participate and, hence, would be limited to an entity
approach. Material participation for this pwpose should not be limited to performance
of services by the owner. In a small enough operation, tor eqmple, the classic
moneyman and service provider, a general partner moneymarfshould be deemed to
matec-ially participate. Probably the benchmark for such deemed materially
participation should be 15 partners including the investor (general) partners.
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Moreover, following through logically, most closely held C corporations would
fWlctionally be aggregates and hence, should not be entitled to defer taxation to the
owner until distribution of pro its. Treasury would avoid this little problem
(encompassing probably 90% of all corporations) by granting automatic non-corporate
statuo; to a general partnership and automatic corporate status to 8 formally organized
corporation, Passthrough Hearings. ~ at 28, in effect only applying the relationship to
the entity analysis to limited partners, indeed, publicly traded limited partnerships or
Master Limited Partnerships.

t

In the context of the MLP issue currently before tbis Subcommittee, the first
policy questiorl ¥ to a Master Limited Partnership is whether its owners should be
entitled to aggregate treatment or be limited to separate entity treatment. Assuming
that the bulk of the owners in a Master Limited Partnership do not materially
participate, such Master Limited Partnership should be treated 95 a separate entity.
Such owners are not entrepreneurs, they are mere investors. Thus, no inside basis
adjustments, fragmentation as to sale or purchase, etc., should be available. The same
denial or partnership aggregate pass-through should apply at least to large (over 15
partners) limi ted partnerships in which the majority of partners (by percent age interest)
do not actively partic~pate. Passthrough of income or loss is a sep ate issue as
indicated above, and is discussed below. Ironically, the mcles, if not the fathers, of
current subchapter l{ anticipated that small partnerships would opt for aggregate
treatment and intended the entity eleet:on aspects of current subchapter K fCX'larger
partnerships. Hearings on General Revenue Revision before the House Committee on
Ways and Means, 83rd Congo 1st Sess. (Part 2) 1370 (953) (statement Of M k H.
Johnson, on behalf of American Bar Association) ("1953 MOISe Hearings"); Jackson,
Jotmson, Surrey &: Warren, A Proposed Revision of the Federal Income Tax Treatment of
Partnerships and Partners-American Law Institute Draft. 9 Tax L" Rev. 109, 129-30
(954). My suspicion is that the present situation in praetice inappropriately is
completely the reverse. Cf. Canellos, supra at IOD6; I.eonard, ~ at 896. We need to
get back to the basics of aggregate treatment.
II. SEPARATE TAXATION OR PASSTHROUGH: INTEGRATION
A.

Introduction

If a majori ty of the partners in a partnership actively participate in the entity's
business, the partnership and its partners should be per-miUed aggregate passthrough tax
treatment (the rationalization of current subchapter K). Probably the same t reatment
should automatically be available based upon a size limitation, say 15 partners (per_ps
limited to general partners). Presumably, also, such a partnership and partners would be
entitled for "simplicity" to elect one time fer entity-conduit or entity passthrough tax
treatment (the rationalization or current subchapter S). At the same time, if a maj<X'ity
of the shareholders in a (close) C corporation 8cti wely participate in the entity's business,
the C corporation and its shareholders should be taxed WIder a PftSSthr~ regime:
elective (a) aggregate passthrough or (b) entity-eonduit CX' passthrough. Again, a
mandatory Passthrough rule probably should apply to close C corporations with under 10
or 15 shareholders (perhaps treating economic family and business groups as 8 single
shareholder). The practical effect of 8 mandatory passthrough could be easily obtained
by (a) eliminating the graduated close C tax brackets under the present regime, and (b)
easier election of pass-through treatment.

Large Ii mi ted partnerships, including but not limi ted to Master Limi ted
Partnerships, and (large) C corporations conducting a big business (over $100,000 net
profits) in which the majority of the owners do not materially participate should be
restricted to a separate entity approach. Under the current system of corporate and
partnership taxation this would mean the current C double taxation approach. The
possibility of entity-pass through or "integration" for such large entities is discussed
below.
B.

Close C Corporation: Mandatery Integration

I.
Mandatory Passthrough of Income and Loss at Entrepreneur's Rates
Since there is no policy reason for taxation as a separate entity to produce less
taxation than direct taxation, particularly where the owners materially participate, in
such close C's at least pass through or income and loss should be mandatory to end the
inside tax she'ter. Lee, Capital Gains Exception to the Houo;e's Genaat Utilities
Repeal: Further Indigestions from Overly Processed CCX'n Products, 30 Tax Notes 1375,
)384 n.39 (986) (small C's); I10lGe 1978 Uearings,~at 3518-19;3 Tax Revision
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Due to the transactional tax costs to such inside shelter (PM' Itir!~ri
General Utilities) discussed below, mandatory passthrough now wo
business a favor-which they will need. In 1982 there were 564,21 9 5'1:.,lGraticas
(260,558 reported a net loss, probably reflecting traditional preferr
up ventures). See Hearings on High-Income Taxpayers .and Related
Issues before the House Wa and Means Subcommittee on Oversi
Sess. 73 1985 statement 0 Ass't Sec'ty Pearlman. In the lat 2
first two weeks of 1987 220,000 S elections were filed. See Leonard.
million or so other close C corporations will find that the 2-year tr
"small" C's as to S 1374's 10-year taint contains an exception for bui
income, e.g., profits, which Is subject to double tax as the inventory t
receivable are collected, albeit more in the latter, thln the Cormer, _
Corporations Berore and Arter the TRA, Tax Adviser 365, 312 (J~e 1

t-

Additionally, sales of larger close CIS (before or after COllY
trigger, directly or indirectly, double taxation on the built-in appr
corresponds to the close C inside tax shelter previ0U5ly enjoyed. T It.. she
the lower C inside rates, plus deferral. Assume that the C's ioside r e
minimum inside bracket varied from 30% to 15% under the 1954 Code).
owner's marginal rate was 50% (that too varied rrom 91 % t o 509t)
but the base was frequently eroded, even totally). If the entity has
assume $25 in close C entity-level taxes, then hypothetical grosse
$100. Had the owner earned this $100 directly, he/she would tave
t
Borrowing from the employee benefit tax area, the dererral privilqoe ~ CQlt 1
0.1
the deferred amount (10% x $15). So the hypothetical tax would be . • eredit
for the $25 deemed paid by the entity. So the proper net tax to pwp
$32.50, which is approximately 45% of accumulated UP. I might .
witnesses scuttled in 1982 a similar 209t) toll charge (20% of exeess 11 " "
outside basis) for C to S conversion ably (resented by Professcr G
the ABA Section of Taxation) to the House Ways and Means Commit
Hearings on H.R. 6055 (Subchapter S Revision Act or 1982) beCcre t
Select Revenue Measures of the House Ways and Meens Com mittee. 97
98-99, 118, 151-53,201,206,209-10,216-35 (982): Whether the newe
for integration can swallow this toll charge this time is another stcry_
lie in prorating the toll-charge over say 5 years as Professor Ginsbwr
ot 225-26. Under this model, hasis step up would be (ropol'tionately . •
year-by-year to the percentage of the tax paid. Alternatively, barr
8
elective regime and Professfr Ginsburg's OOsEl'Yation that a basis
t
to an increase in ruture incom e, Id. at 217, Corm er C's could reduce
appropriate cherge Instead of an Tmputed "reallzation" toll charge.
Under such mandatory passthrough, close COs should be enti Ued to
aggregate (K model) pass through, as witnesses have often suggested, !!!. PMIdt........
Hurin,s. supra at 95 (statement or John Pennell);~H~e~an~·~n~p~o~nijG~en~er!:![t~~;!~~!!.
before the House Committee on Ways and Means. 85th Congo 2d Sess. (
U
(colloquy between Congressmen Koegh and Sheehan); 1953 House He!ri!p,
(statement of American Institute oC Accountants); (the Senate in 195 .. .
would have allowed a qualifying corporation to elect tax treatment
p·.....ntllp,
(a) a 10 shareholder active participant limit, (b) restrictions on nonresident aliens, and (c) a single class d. stock, S. Rep. No. 1622, 83d
45253 (1954) (the provision WIS stricken without explanation in Conferenee:), • well •
probably an S or entity past-through modeL
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2.

Conventional C lose C Tax Planning

Conventional wisdom advocated "manipulat ivn" of (a) outside indi vi dual inco me
rates as to "compensation" from the enterprise and inside graduat ed C corporate r at es on
its retained income in the small closely-he!d corporati on cont ext. in or der to obt ain an
"inside tax shelter." Lee, supra. This abuse was pointed out to Congres:: lO ilg ngo. 3 Ta~
Revision Compendium, Compendium of Pa ers on Broa deni n<T th(> Tax Bas e Submi tted to
the House Committee on Ways and Means at 1686-87 U959) s t a tem ent of Janin); see also
lIeorin on the Revenue Act of 1978 before the Seriate Comm itt ee on Finruwe 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. 136 19'18) Sec'ty of Treasury Blu menthal) ('"W e t hin k this gradua tion at
the bottom lof the inside corporate tax rates] is reall y w hat has been refer red to in tn c
literature as the ultimate tax haven, tax shelter, £Or a high inccme indi vi;u a l
Th u ~,
the regl.llar C corporlltion was "ultimate t~x haven, t ax shelter" --un de r the 1954 Code for
the closely-held business annually retaining $100,000-$20 0,000 in pr ofi ts and pa yi ng out
the res t of it') profits as hopefully deduc·tible compensation to prin ci pals. See Star r, S
~~ration: Is it the Right Choicel., 43 N. Y.U. lns\. on Fed. TttX. 5- 1, a t 5-36 (l98 S[
Sec gcnerallf Watkins &. .Jacobs, Closely Held Busi ness: Tax Planni ng Aft er ERTA, 9 Tax
Adviser 516 1982). Such manipulation, coupled with a dllte of death step-up in basis at
the owner level in the corporate stock upon his/her death, § 101 4(9), IUld unde r t he 195 4
Code cod ification of General Utilities non-recogni tion at t he inside COI"po!'8t e ic vel on
inside gain upon a taxable disposition of the C corpor ation or its assets, 'is 336, 331 and
338, meant 8 S a practical matter that use of a C cor poration, fa r fr om re'.;ulting in double
tf...Xation on corpor ate income from operations MC apprf'ciation in as5'!t:;, often actually
yielded under the 1954 Code less total taxes at tt~ c om bine d shareholder and cor porat e
levels, than if the principal had not inrorporated t he vent ure in the first place. Sen. Fin.
Comm. Staff, Preliminary Repor t, The Reform & S!m plification of t he income Taxa tic n
of Corporations, S. Print 95, 98th Congo 1st Sess. 8S (1 983). Thi s absurd r esult can no t be
justified by any tax policy _ Id. at 88 (Other than capit al fOl"mation as discussed a bove,
and surely better ways existfor that purpose). The r eal issut", theref ore, unde r the 1954
Code was not double taxation, but whether the Servi ce wotLld coHeet one t a x one t im e.
The amount of this tax cxp('nditure could be as hi gh as $5 b illion 8 year 0,00 0, 000 c lose
CiS x $5,000 ($50,000 x ! 3% spread» if so, it should be bett ~r targeted, e.g., to minority
busi nesses, etc.
lt

) .

3.

Hidden t:-ansactional coS"ts under the 1954

~nd

1986 Codes.

Such use of a C corpor-ation as an inside tax s helter entails, howe ver, substantial
transactional tax costs, and is the sotl'ce of muc h, if not most, of t he 1954 Code
corporate shareholder tax complexity and endless a dm inistrative controversy in the
corporate and shareholder taxation arena, which continues under the 1986 Code. For
example, balancing the income from the venture between c ompensation to princi pal aad
retained taxable income not exceeding the lowest corpor ate gradua ted brac kets
generates the problem of "unreasonable compensation" not ded uctible to t he
corporation.' Retention of corporate earnings to obtai n the lower inside t 8:( bracket
rather than payment to shareholders, t riggering t r ue double taxation, poses "accumUlated
earnings tax" problems, see Watkins &. Jacobs, supra; Heari ngs on Tax Shelters,
Accounting Abuses, and Corporate and Securities Reform before the House Committee
on Ways and Means, 98th Cong. 2d Sess. 156 (984) (statement of Marti n Ginsburg)
(hereina f ter "Tax Shelter Hearings"); wi t h clumbsy retention of ea rnings for a personal
investment program, personal holding compMy tax problems instead. Furthermore,
splitting personal service income between a close C and the s ha reholder-employee gives
rise to intense § 482 deemed arm's length reallocation of income <Jr deductions
problems. Even if the retention of profits at the corpor:at~ level is ultimately respected,
attempts to realize the economic benefit at t he shareholder level prior to the sale of the
business often creates new tax problems, ~ whether (a) withdr awals structured as
"loans" constitute constructive di vidends (a recent study by my colleague Jayne Barnard
demonstrates that in her sample of previously close corporations engaged in an ini tial
public offering, nearly 50% had made substantial loans during a 3-year lookback to their
ofricers or directors; the comparable figure for puillicly held corporations is 16%), (b)
sale/exchange or dividend treatment applies to redemption payments upon retirement, as
wen as, (c) whether the "collapsible corporation provisions will apply. The latter problem
areas «b) and (c)) should disappear, except for basis recovery in redemptions, if the 1988
elimination of the capital gains preference actually comes into effect and remains in
effect. Finally, offsetting the 15e of a C as an inside tax shelter was one of the primary
(post-facto) policy jus lineations for the 1986 repeal of Gmeral Utilities. See Sheppard,
General Utilities Repeal. 33 Tax Notes 183 (1986).
-
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°3 6 Code ma kes four major changes and one perhll p-:
_ af fecting choice of tax entity for small b usinesse~ ..,,
~
==-~-=..;::::::.;c_
osely fIeld Corporations, Using Corporati ons for T ax ~ - _
I .. J. Corp. Tax. 160 (1987). Davis, E::.f:.::f:.=e~ct.:::::-=ol;:.....;;the
=-..;..
T-=u::....:=.=..;~~;...".:;;;~.:..=..=....
o r Entity Decision, 6 Tax Mgm't Weekly Report -4 14
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c; PAL pr ovisions (§ 469), when fully phased in,
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Finance Committee, 98th Congo 1st. Sess. 2 (1983) (statement of Chairman Dole; "it is
pretty clear to this Senator that politics and economics will prevent any radical ch ang ~
[such as abolishing the corporate level tax or taxing shareholders on all corporate inco e
without regard to i t9 distribution) in the near future."), a.c; this Subcommittee was told b y
Treasury last summer.
As to It Master Limited Partnerships" clearly the current classification and t ax
treatment as an "aggregate" passthrough entity is inappropriate from a t>olicy
perspective because most if not all owners of MLP's do not materially participate In t tl!!
entity's active business. Therefore policy mandates separate entity treatment rat her
than an aggregate passthrough treatment. This raises the question then whether t he III LP
as a separate entity should be enti tied to pass through or conduit treatment in the Co
of
full or partial integration. First the current non-partnership passthrough models (ot he!'
than S corporation) do not appear appropriate, although I do not profess to any speci
expertise as to regulated investment companies. real estate investment trusts, and the1r
newer analogues. It appears to me however, from testimony in prior hearings that t he
hallmark of passthrough as to such entities is that the income of the entity be passi'te.
Here we are concerned with active income/passive investor. Nor does the trust m o ~l
appear a.>plicable, since historically here too the distinction was between active in
e
and passive income; and, more significantly, most trusts similar to Master Limited
Partnerships would fall on the separate entity side of classification. Recall that
Morrissey itself involved a business trl~t.
Subchapter S indeed is the appropriate passthrough entity model for MLP's, i. e..
entity pass through, not aggregate passthrough. However, in order to maintain (a) lhe
political trade-oUs of the 1986 Code and (b) horizontal and vertical equity through
corporate sector schedular income, any such passthrough income must in a schedular
fashion bear the appropriate estimated corporate sector tax. Compare Canellos,
Corporate Tax Integration: By Design or By Default, 35 Tax Notes 999, 1007 (198 7).
Moreover, allocations under such a separate entity passthrough would follow the " m c.- ~
rigid" uni t or ownership model and no inside basis adjustments or special allocations
would be permitted
2.

Schedular Pass through or Double Taxation.

Since progressive rates have been compressed, horizontal and vertical equi ty wi t h
pass through of separate entity income, i.e., MLP's and ~rtain large limited partn
.ps
can only be obtained through passthrough of "schedular income" (active business and
inactive Wlit owners) which carries with it at least the targeted "corporate sector t •
bll'den as to such income, say above $100,000. I call this the "F.N. Bard" proPOS .~ i
honor of the Illinois rancher, farmer and small manufacturer who proposed in the 195.3
House Hearings (as well as 011 many other occasions) that partnerships be allowed to
(then lower) C corporation rates as to business income, with regular higher indiYi
rates on porlfolio income, 1953 House Hearings, supra at 1363 (statement of F. N. a.rd)-a schedular income idea before its time and partially enacted in litlle \Bed and now
repealed Subchapter R. Of course, Bard wanted the inside C shelter so a partnership
could compete/with corporations. Id. at 1368.

,

Simply taxing such "corporate sector" income cirectly to the individual partn
in
MLP's and large limited partnerships at 34% on the existing corporate sector tax
e.
probably would produce only an effective rate of say 22% on economic income (and
y
then if corporate-like minimum tax and timing shifts apply) and at the same time w d
ignore the usually deferred and minimal "double taxation" at the non-tax exempt
sharehOlder level on ultimate owner "realization" through "c:Hvidends," sale or liquidation,
etc. The mere simple and probably most equitable "integration" treatment or MLP's d
large limited partnerships and their partners as to such "corporate sector" schedular income (active business, passive owners) would be to provide an election: (l) treatm t
in all ways as a large C with an entity level 34% rate on the existing corpcll'ate base with
an inside corporate-like mini mum tax, phs an outside shareholder level 28% tax as ll)
taxable realizations by partner-owners, or (2) an entity-conduit integration along
rationalized S model lines with preferably a 28% (or phantom 33%) tax at the "partner"
level on the entity's ~mic income, i.e, without preferences or timing cistortions,
regardless of whether dlstrlbuled, with a basis increase for subsequent tax-free
withdrawal at the partner level. Such treatment of MLP's and large limited partn ers pIS
could be a model for ultimate integration of large C's were the politics ever to chan re~
Remember that they thought that there would be no 1986 Code.
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The losses of such a separate active business entity with passive owners would not
shelter other income of the taxpayer pIIJ'tner, whether frum services, portfolio, or similar
non-aggregate passthroughs. Treasury has ample authority under current S 469(kX3) to
handle this problem without further legislation. S~ Passthrough Hearings. supra at 1314 (awareness by Treasury of MLP's as method orgaming PAL rules unless special
precautions are taken, viz S 469(kX3». Therefore, merely providing that MLP's income is
portfolio income for purposes of the PAL provisions is not really a compromise position
by the indmtry. Treasury already holm that card.
If such schedular pass through of income or full integration at least as to income is
not feasible, politically or administratively, then MLP's and their partners and large
limited partnerships and their partners should both bear the current subchapter C double
taxation regime as to "corporate sector income."

Ill. USE AND NATURE OF MLP'S
Commentary and witnesses in prior hearings heve pointed out thet the revenue
amount involved in taxing MLP's as large C's is not significant, and there is no
widespread disincorporation of existing large C corporations. However, mder the
cll"rent rules taxpayers with expert advice will struchre new ventures, as in the high
tech area, as limited partnerships, see Passthrough Het'.rings. ~ at 38-39 (statement
of Assistant Secretary Mentz), partially in antiCipation of the entity going public without
triggering a post-General Utilities repeal tax as to appreciation in the entity's assets.
This alone makes the playing field tmequa1. Id.
. Commentators and witnesses at other hearings have also explained that under the
current partnership rules (especially special allocations) MLP's and limited partnerships
will be used to' "spin off" portions of a busine:;s or an existing large C corporation through
transfer of such portion to 8. limited partnership in exchange for a general partnership
interest. See Freeman, Some Early Strategies for the Methoc:lcal Disincorporation of
Am~ica A'1ter the Tax Reform Act of 1986: Drafting Partnerships onto C C(.(tJ)O!'ations.
Running Amok with the Master Limited Partnership Concept tmd Generally Endeavoring
to Deteat the Pension or the Drartsmen of the Repeal or General Utilities. 64 Taxes 962,
967, 975 (1986); Hearings on Tax Shelters, Accounting Abl.Bes, and Corporate and
Securities Reforms Before the Home WayS and Means Committee. 98th Congo 2d Sess.
469-70 (984) (statement of David Glickman); Senate &ibchapter C Hearings. supra at
518-21 (Id.»; Cf. Sheppard, Walk this Way: Taxing Publicly Traded Limited Partnerships
as Corporations. 35 Tax Notes 86, 87 (987). In this least-abusive spin-orr the limited
partnership interests are either distributed to shareholders or sold to the public. In a
more sophisticated version, variations or partnership "estate freeze" special allocations
are utilized in such a limited partnership with the goal of shifting rutwe appreciation,
income and opportunities attributable thereto to the limited partners. In this scenario
the C corporation receives a frozen general partnership interest with future value going
to the liml ted partners, who may indeed be shareholders in the eorporate general
partner. See Freeman, supra at 979. More aggressive, in my opinion, are nip-nop
allocations of operating income coupled wi th a <lfferent ratio fer stlSring appreciation in
the underlying business assets. Freeman, supra at 979. Most gamy would be a
combination of some, or all, of the above in a close C context in which substantially all
of the limited partnership interests are acquired for a nominal amount by the
shareholders of the close, but larg~ C corporatloo, .hich after the transfer of its
business for a substantially frozen general partnership interest, then elects Subchapter S
status. Since the limited partnership interests are not publicly traded, the preferred
approach of TreBsury as to classification would not stop this gamesmanship. Rewriting
the S 704(b) regulations to (a) propel'ly renect an aggregate approach and, hence, time
vaJue of money and assignment of income principles, and tb) remove the thumb on the
scales as to ACRS deductions, no longer policy-based aCter PAL, would halt the most
t:gregious abuses. The step tran3t<ction and proper aggregate approach as to 5 704(b)
allocations would prevent by-passing 5 J374 by the fermer C, now S corporation. Only a
deep structll"e revision of subchftpters l't and S limiting MLP's and limited partnerships in
which most partners do not materially participate to an entity-conduit regime with no
special allocations (and integration only through a passthl'ough or schedular corporate
sector inccme) would end all gamesmanship here.
.
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STATEMENT OF LEWIS H. SANDLER GENERAL J'IiARTNER, SOUTH·
WEST REALTY, LTD., AND ON BEHALF OJ? THE NATIONAL
APARTMENT ASSOCIATION
9

Mr. SANDLER. I am Lewis Sandler. I appreciate your permitting
me to appear today on behalf of the Nath:nal Apartment Association and Southwest Realty, Ltd., a publicly traded master limited
partnership engaged in real estate, prinulrily multifamily units in
the Southwest.
Southwest Realty commenced operations and trading of its depositary receipts in February 1983. At that time we didn't know what
an MLP was. We had never heard of one. Southwest Realty was
created through a so-called rollup of 14 existing partnerships, each
owning its own cash flowing, income-producing property in which
my two partners and I were individual general partners.
There were three major considerations behind our rollup, none
tax-related. The first and foremost consideration was liquidity. We
have he~d a lot about that) so I think I will move on and just
mention that with respect to liquidity, Southwest Realty was bom
with the knowledge and blessing of the Treasury Department.
We had applied for and received a private ruling from the Treasury Department that our MLP would be treated for Federal income
tax purposes as a partnership. The ruling was issued on the basis
of certain stated facts, one of which was our tmdeability and liquidity.
Without the ruling, we and others who followed us probably
would not have vent ured onto Wall Street.
The second most important factor behind our rollup was the ability of Southwest Realty to raise capital, additional capital, that its
predecessor partnerships were unable to raise.
In fact, subsequent to completion of the rollup, we raised a substantial amount of additional equity capital through a public offering of our depositary receipts. The proceeds of the offering were
used primarily to retire existing debt.
The third and per haps the most important factor inhen~nt in our
decision to use an MLP format-was our desire to basically control
our ow-_ destiny. In that regard we looked very closely at other
forms of business entities that we could have chosen, including and
perhaps especially BElTs.
Mr. Vander Jagt earlier asked whether there were substantive
differences between an MLP and a REIT for real estate entities,
and I can unequivocally say yes. Some of them include: control,
separate management requirements of a REIT, the requirement of
a REIT to distribute a minimum amount of income, whether or not
the income is passive, and the possible or potential problem of
phantom income, the prohibition against reinvesting certain gains
and the questions involving active and passive income, to name a
few.
In addition, we have heard a number of questions raised by the
panel regarding the argument that an MLP walks and talks like a
duck so it must be taxed as a corporation. Contrary to what Mr.
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Mentz said earlier, there are substantive differences between an
MLP and a corporation.
I have discussed many of those in my submission, which I would
like to be placed in the record, please.
.
In addition, I would like to mention two differences Ll'l particular,
the first of which is the control issue, and I believe that it is more
traditional in partnership format to have the general partners or
g~neral partner in control of management with very little proviSIon to replace that management.
There are so-called democracy provisions applicable to MLP's,
but they are substantively different, for the most part, from the democracy provisions applicable to corporations.
The second difference I would like to mention is that of liability.
There are tw<? ]larts to that liability issue. The first part is the general partner. Under partnership law you must have a responsiblea financially, economically responsible general partner to whom
creditors can tum.
There is no such requirement with a corporation. H the corporation gets into trouble, you take its assets and that is it. There is no
one else to look to. 'l'hat is inherently not the case in an MLP or in
any partnership format.
In addition, Mr. Cain mentioned that there is a certain amount
of potential liability to the limited partners that you don't have in
the corporation format. That liability specifically has t.o do with
the obligation of limited partners-investors to return distributions
to the partnership if the partnership improperly made a distribution and there were insufficient funds remaining with which to pay
creditors.
I would .like to also mention in passing that not only did we have
a Treasury private ruling that said that we would be treated as a
limited partnership, but I was here back in 1983 testifying before
the Senate Finance Committee on the same exact issue, and at that
time there was a hue and cry in the papers and in the press and a
serious concern in 1983 that we were going to have a disincorporation of America, an.d I seem to have been defending it ever since.
It hasn't happened. Four and a half years later we still have ap:proximately 100 master limited partnerships, hardly what I would
call the disincorporation of America.
In closing, I find myself in the unfortunate position of having to
disagree somewhat with one of my colleagues who spoke earlier
today, and agreeing in part with Mr. Mentz. I fmd that a little surprising. Nonetheless, I believe, contrary to the _~ition taken earlier by one of the panelists that we should tax all MLPs the same. If
in fact we end up with a disincorporation problem or it becomes
more i real than apparent, there is always time to do something
about it.
I don't think we should make any distinction, tax wise between
any form of MLP, be it in real estate, energy or in any other business.
I would like to note that back in February 1984 in testimony
before the House Ways and Means Committee at hearings on tax
shelters, accounting abuses and corporate and securities reforms,
there was a statement made on behalf of Mercedes-Benz by its then
outside counsel, J. Roger Mentz, who was concerned about a pro-
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posal to limit tax benefits on automobiles. He stated "If you are absolutely bound and determined to achieve a legislative solution on
automobiles, do it in a way that is nondiscriminatory.'"
If you are bound and determined to achieve a legislative solution
on passthrough entities, please do it in a way that is nondiscriminatory and treat all master limited partnerships the same, and in
the same manner as you treat all other partnerships.
[The statement of Mr. Sandler follows:]

356
TESTIMONY
of
LEWIS H. SANDLER
on behalf of the
NATIO~AL

APARTMENT ASSOCIATION

Mr. Olairnml and
Members of tre Select Committee:
Thank you for invitL-.g ~ to appear before this Select Cwmittee ro
behalf of the National ApartJrent Association and Soudioiest Realty. Ltd.,
a publicly traded ("Master") lUllited partnership er-.gaged in the CMlerSh1p
and operation of incare-producing real est:ate, primarily lIUlti-family
housing units in the southwest.
I am persroally. in my indivicbll
capacity. one of the general partners of Southoest Realcy.
In addition to tax and pure econanic coosiderations surrounding the
proposal tv treat certain partnerships as corporations for tax purposes,
the NatiOt".al Apart:mmt Association is concerned about the potentially
adverse inpact on the tIUlti-fClIlily housing L~t:ry that such proposal.
if enacted, would engender. Specifically, the primary source of equity
capital for new construction of t!Ulti-family t-~ing units ~~ the
country has traditionally been the large partnership format. fobltifamily housing still requires sources of equity capital to assure a
contir.u:ing source of rental housing. The proposal under crosidera-cicn
'wU.Jld eliminate one of the primary soorces of readily available equity
capital at affordable prices.
Sou!:..~st Realty cc.utIElced operations and trading of depositary
receipts representing the economic attributes of its lUnited partnership
interests in February 1983. Southwest Realty was created through a
so-called "roll-up" of 14 existing l.i!l!ited partners.'rl.ps. each ~ its
()1;.1[\ cash flowing, inca:ne-producing property i.'1 -tlic.'1 my two partners and
I were already the gt:neral partners. ntere were three major considerations behind our roll-up. None of L~ ...>ere tax-related.

'lhe first and foreroost consiOera~ion was liquidity.
Prior to
February 1983. we were not able to of~er cur limite<! partner im..estors an
opport:1.mity tc sell or hypothecate t.~ir limited pa."'t:nership interests.
~or were these investors able to effectiw.!.:;- utilize their illiquid
partnership investments in their estate planning. Prior to the advent of
l-l.Ps, traditional invest:::rent partnerships did not enjoy liquidity. That
has changed today with the listing for tradi.n.g of St:lIe (currently still
fewt!r than 100) limited partnerships ant:! t.~ creation of other investment
vehicles designed to acquire limited partnership i.."1terests in existing
(otherwise illiquid) Ill!".:' ted parmt!rs!ri?s.
Our liquidity. by the way. W'c.i.S born \o.'it.'l tl-.e knowledgt: and blessings
of the Treasury Deparorent. ~ applied fIJr and receh'W a private ruling
from the Tre8£ury Department that our ~....p wccl.d be treated for federal
incane tax purposes as a partnership. The ruling was issued on the basis
of certain facts, incl1.lding the anticipated listing of our deposita--y
leceipts for trading on a national exchar.ge. Without such ruling we, and
others who follO'W'ed ir1 our footst~s, \oIOUld not l-.ave ventured onto Wall
Street.

'l'oday we are still a limited partnership. We are still engaged in
the c::7'Wt'\ership and operation of substantially the sare incaIe producing
real estate that we owned and operated in 1982 ",flen we obtained the
ruling. We oIlI'e trading regularly in an orderly market. We continue to
file tax returns and issue K-l's to our imrestors. Nothing has changed.
Today. however. we hear that we would be treated for tax purposes as a
corporation.
I
subroit that such treatm:!nt is inequitable and
unnecess8rJ.
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We have deprived the goverIJIe1t of ro reverue. We do not mrket our
~positary receipts on the bc:sit: of tax aevantages. In fact to the best
of our knowledge, the investing public has never paid a penny for the tax
a.spec~s of our . MLP; rather. we believe t.~t they have purchased the
depoSl.tary recelpts because of the yield or ~lying value of the
assets. This is probably true of tIDSt of the MUt's in the markecpl.a.ce,
although there are a few that are basically service..-oriented and appear
to trade on the basis of their earnings, actual or potential.

The second lOOst ~t factor behind wr roll-up \Al.S the ability
of Southwest Realty to raise capital - addit~l capital that its
predecessor partnerships were unable to ra:ise. In fact:. ~t to
t.~ cOOl>letion of the roll-up, we raised a
tmtial ~ of additional capital in the form of equity through a pe.:blic o~ of our
depositary receipts. The proceeds fran this uffer'..ng Wft'e uaed primJrlly
to retire existing debt.
Although generally, an ~ has the ability to issue edditicr..a1
equity or debt, we and many of the other M[p's hINe fCADi that in industries such as real estate, the ability to raise additl.cmal capiw
especially in the fonn of equity, is mre readily ava:i.able and tm cost
is mre econcmic, than trying to raise additional debt. In the SoutDlea1:
wnere our rulti-family housing projects are located. IIIII'ket aniitioos
today do not lend themselves readily to new debe i.stIues . In face, a.
newspapers are full of articles regard:f.ng the lNbUity of e::d.stq
~ producing real estate to t!Eet their c:urrenc debt cbl.iptions . For
sane, the ability to raise additional capital in the fonD of equity
be the means for survival.
A third factor ~t to and i."ilerent in an K.P is ~'.
control of i.ts own destiny. Frankly, lb!n we 1oIen! ccnsider1:w our
roll-up, we considered and rejected t.lje corponte f
t ~ we had
no desire to go to the trouble and expens~ of f<m:zi.ng an ~
to ~
it ti:iken over by corporate raiders.

001,

Traditionally, a limited partriUship structure includes no readily
available mechanism for a change in mrmag~ . Prospective inwstors of
limited partnership interests are generally ~ tha~ they are buying a
management tean and that in the absence of aalfeaunce i t is di.ff1c:ult at
best, to replace that teaD.. A review of DDSt of the K.,P's that !wve c::ame
to market: in the last four years leads ae to bel.ieve that the centrol
iss~ is a daninant factor :Jl the spmsor's detezmf.nation to adcpc •
partnership format. That is not to say that min:iDun so-ca.lled It&:.,..
cracy" requirements are not observed. I believe that they are ~ at far
less expense to the equity investors.
Having described Sou~~ Realty's indiviWal siwatic:m, I liCUl.d
t.~ "corporate characteristics" issue. part1cularly the
idea that size and tradeabillty are appropr~te criterf...a f ar ~
tax treatmmt. It appears that uuch of the inurest in ~ me tax
t:natmmt of publicly traded limited partnmJh:ips has been generated by a
belief that these entities so closely reMllble oorporatims that: equity
~ls it.
This reseublance is superficial. however. baed ahlmt
entirely on size and public tr~. 'Ibese elaa!nts are not determinative criteria under C\.UTent law, and 1 feel that they sba.Ild not be mder
any new system of classification that ~s or '!'reasur:y mi&bt adopt.

like to address

Under the current classification regu1at:ians. known as the lC:int:ner
regulations, a partnership is defined as IJ'trf un:incorporated ~
which carries on a trade, business, ~i.al operati.c:ms. or wnture.
The organization will be treated as a taxable assocl.atial rather tbm a
partnership for tax purposes if it is CCCJFOsed of associates lib> have m
objective to carry on a business or financial. enterprise and divide the
gains and also possesses at least three of the fCAJr "corporate" characteristics: 1) continuity of life; 2) centralizaticxl of~, 3)
limited liability, and 4) free transferability of interests.

Publicly traded limited partnerships have been classified as partnerships by the IRS because they do not possess t!m'e than two of the fa.rr
charactmstics . ~le it is ~rally corlCeded that publicly traded
l'imited partnership possess centralized ~t, and of course their
interests are freely traCed, they do not possess cantirarl.ty of life and
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1rose who ~d focus on t:radeabillq . as the
criterion, therefore, wwld be greatly III!gnilying the
uqx>rtance of a characteristic which for the _pasc t'Wt51ty-seven yeIQ:'8
has--quite correctly--been only one of four equally loIeighted criteria.
limited liability.

?etermining

One of the considerations before you coday is lilether the Kintner
regulatioO~L~reworking. If that is &me, I urge that you avo"Tcrttii
teuptation to make size and ttadeabilit:y the ~ crlteria for
distinguishing partnerships fran corporations.
In the first place, public trading has never been in face a determillative or even significant characteristic of c:oqxmlu SUtuIS. 'lhe
stock of sane 98% of all corporations is not p:blicly traded. fUrtherDDre, the use of public trading as a eetenUnative factor pella real
definitional problEms. Markets are TlOii developing for synd1c:ated partnership interests. Sane of these markets are ~ . others are roc.
Sane are regulated; others are not. 'I'radeabillty is In ani.f1c1a1 IhI1
inappropriate criterion for deciding \oI1ether a part:nI!rSb1p ~ to be
treated as a corporation for tax purposes. It is an external c:ba:racteristic that has little to do with the intrinsic nature of an orpni.zation and its business activities.

In connection with the issue of t::radNbility • . I refer JOU CO •
scatement tMde to the Senlate Finance Camlittee on ~ 24 . 1983 by me
then Deputy Assistant Secrecar"l for Tax Policy • Cepe acne ot the
Treast:I)'. Speaking on ~lf of the Tre&sury Depc: awnt ~ a
proposal to treat publicly-traded limited ~ as c:orpont:l.CDS
foc.tBX MPOses, Mr. Pearlman stated ..... We have serious dr;:U)c that
after such an analysis. one 100lld cmclude that the degree of
marketability of an organization's equity interest shJu!d detercine the
manner in \Which the organization is taxed." I ccacur with Tre&sury's
position as so stated by Mr. Pearlman.

For similar reasons, the use of size as a determinBnt: is equally
inappropriate. Many syndicated, non-traded part:nerships are as large as
or larger than many publicly traded partnenhips. ~ co:a:pozations are
far smaller--the majority have less ~'1.q one mil l.icn dollars in nec
wrth. The nuIber of participants in an drganir.a~i.or. or the size of its
business assets is siIIl>ly rot a valid or rele'oW\t cricerial for
determining federal tax classificEtion.
These criteria are i.napprot:riate rot only because they are iDaccurate, but because they create a con..4=lict: with StAte part:DerIh1p lAlS
(generally the Uniform Limited Partnership Act or Rev4..sed l.b1fcma lJII1ted
Partnership Act), \ooirl.ch treat publicly ttadecl llmiw partnerships as
partnerships rather tOOn corporations, and because they ignore several
differences between publicly cradeO partnerships and corporaticms that:
are far lIX)re significant than size and ttadeabilit:y. These differences,
wch tend to wrk to the disadvantage of partnerships, are iDportant
both to an individual's investment decision ani the capayer's declsiat
as to which fonn of business to adopt. They include:
Liability: A noted above, MIPs, like other parmenhips do not
offer investors coopletely unlimited liabilNy. 'lbe assets of at:
least one general .partner in an MLP mlSt be :readlable by creditors.
In addition, the limited partners may also be li.able to the partnership's creditors in certain cases, e.g., \llen there bas been a
distribution of capital to the partner prior to the time the liability arose. nus is a significant disincentive to l.nvestars.
Perpetuity: Also as roted above. corporations are perpetual in
nature, while publicly traded paro:;erships. like all partnershiP.
are tor a fixed term of years and rray be tenninated by cry one of
several occurrences.
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Taxation on undistributed incaDe:

1Jolike corporate shsxebolders,

partners in a publicly traded partnership are t.aed en their sbIIre
of partnership incaDe li4lether or ru cash is distributed to tba:a.
'1llis is a disincentive to investors and. becalse it: puta pnuure en
the MLP to mintain high cash distribut:ia1s ratber t:hm to retain
and reinvest earnings, a major dis:incentive for busineaa CMWrII.
Limits on institutional. investors: Institutimal:investors such as
tax..exeupt pension funds, universities, and private fomdat:ions are
a major source of capital for corporatims. Various state and
federal laws, how'ever, restrict the abiliey of these instit.uticJlla 1:0
invest in publicly traded limited partnerships.
State law: As roted above, publicly traded umted partnerships
operate under state partnership, rather thin c:mporate. 1.811. The
fact that state partnership law is less a:q>rebensive and less
settled than corporate law is another disincentiw to business
owners.
An entity level tax has been iJqx>sed on corporations at: ~
partially as payment for t:.~ benefics they receive &em incoI:poratian.
And ever since the incaDe ax was first ~, businesses have been
able to make the tradeoff. '!bey have been able to cbooee lihether 1:0
enjoy the ·benefits of incorporation md pay a corporate tax in return or
to forego these benefits al.c::qt with the UlIt. I see no nuon lihy either
size or public trading shouldbe enaugtl to deny businesees this choice.

In slm1:, ~ you exEine the questim of claasifi.cacion and
pass-through entities, I urge that you resist the teq>t:atim 1:0 ~ a
standard that loIWld base entity level taxad.an ~ factors IUCh as s Ue or
public trading Wich have little to do with the fam in Vdch busines8es
have chosen to operate. I understand the appeal of these criteria; m.y
appear on the surface to be siIIple and euy to apply. !.\It me thing that
I an sure you have learned in the process of ~ refoJm. is that siDp1icity can often 'WOrk against logic and equity.
'!be fact that an MLP is large and publicly traded does not IIIUIl that
it enjoys the benefits of incorporation .a1 should pay for them thrcugh a
corporate tax. In fact, MLPs .;;njoy very few of the
that
corporations do. That is ~ they-are still less than me ~ of the
capital market. To lIIpose a corporate tax on tbIIm liOUld ru serve the
c:ause of equity. It liIWld, in fact, do ~ the opposite. As a businessman and the general partner of an }UJ, I ask that you c:ontiDJe to
allow us to choose for ourselves libi.ch benefits md burdI!n8 are ~ best
roes for our ~)anies to assune.

In closing I would like to 1e8\.'e you with a stab!llDent .-de in
February 1984 before the lbuse Ways and
Ca:l:litue at ~ on
Tax Shelters, AccC".Jr.ting Abuses and Coxporate and Securities BefODliS.
The statemmt was ttWlde on behalf of Mercedes-~.z by ics then outside
counsel, J. Roger ~tz, who was cmcerned abwt a proposal to limit C8X
benefits on pa~senger auturobiles w.-ed for business purposes to the first
$15.000 of cost. Mr. Mentz stated '-ro the extent thet there is a
personal benefit problEm with autc:::allbile.s. it exists for all bua1.nas
aut<m>bil.t:s, rot just those priced over $15. 000 .
... i f ,w are
absolutely bound and deteImined to achieve a legislative solution on
autaJDbiles, do it in a way that is nondiscriminatory. I I Qm~ with
Mr. Mentz's analogy. if you are bound and detenzdned to achieve a
legislative solution on pass-through entities, do it in a way that: is
nondiscrim:ir.atory and treat Master Limited Partr.ershi.p in the
1IIIImII!r
as you treat all partnerships.
Pl~ leave us with our liquidity and sources of equity capital.
lhe uulti-faad.ly housing indlstry and Sou1:lwest: Rt:alty, Ltd. urge you 1:0
maintain the existir.g tax treatment for master limited partnersh:ips.
Thank you for ywr time and consideration.

Very truly yoors,

By:

~JL_

s.
er
General Partner
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Mrs. KENNELLY. Thank you.
I am going to adjourn the hearing for ten minutes and I will be
back after I vote at 20 after.
[Recess.]
Mrs. KENNELLY. The hearing will continue with testimony by
Mr. Rosenthal.
STATEMENT OF JEF FREY R. ROSENTHAL, MEMBER., SUBCOAL'IIT..
TEE ON FEDERAL TAXATION, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF
REALTORS, AND CHAIRMAN, TAX CO
l'ITEE, REAL ESTATE
SECURITIES AND SYNDICATION INSTITUTION
1

Mr. RosENTHAL. Thank you.
I am Jeffrey R. Rosenthal. I am a partner in the Chicago office of
Peat, Marwick, Main & Co. I am testifying on behalf of the National Association of Realtors, and its affiliate, KESSI. The NAR is an
umbrella organization consisting of approximatel1 750,000 members with interests in all types of real estate activities.
RESSI represents approximately 3,000 members who specialize in
investment in income-producing real estate and mortgage loans, 88
well as the creation and issuance of real estate securities. Many of
these real estate securities are designed to attract investment from
middle-income investors, by offering relatively low-co8t investment
units which would not otherwise be affordable to those people.
Our primary recommendation to this subcommittee is that the
tax treatment of limited partnerships as pass-through entities
should be maintained, including the tax treatment of master limited partnerships, MLPs. An Ml.P should be aefined as a limited
partnership having equity securities which are both publicly offered and traded. A more explicit definition is included in my written testimony. Such securities are hereinafter called listed securities.
The tax treatment of partnerships, including MLPs, should be
maintained because it is a proven capital formation technique, particularly for middle-income taxpayers. Some Iill.,Ps have been designed to appeal to wage earners with annual incomes as low as
$25,000. We feel that any limitation on capital formation, and particularly one aimed at limiting low risk, diversified investments to
middle-income taxpayers, would be an undesirable effect of this
subcommittee's recommendations.
In addition, the 1986 Tax Reform Act eliminated the 'perceived
abuses which were previously associated with tax preferences, but
which were not directly attributable to passthrough entities.
Consequently, entity classification rules designed to eliminate or
limit passthrough entities are not warranted. The Treasury Department and the Joint Committee on Taxation have proposed to reclassify such entities as corporations, by subjecting them to either
the corporate tax or the corporate minimum tax or by subjecting
their investors to certain aspects of the corporate minimum tax.
Each of these proposals improperly attacks the limited partnership as the cause of tax abuoe and is inappropriate because the perceived tax abuses have been eliminated and attacks on passthrough
entities improperly focus on a distribution vehicle within a now
neutral tax code. Therefore, reclassification proposals would
J
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achieve little, while disrupting an important source of capital formation.
A major reason for investment in MLPs and other limited partnerships is to raise equity capital to reduce or retire debt or to acquire unleveraged real estate. This is in direct response to the antidebt policy of the Tax Reform Act of 1986. The use of equity financing on partnership properties increases the investors' cash flows
through reduced debt service.
This is also coincident with the 1986 tax reform goal of economically motivated investment decisions. In addition, debt reduction
,; >~----- has the effect of reducing the exposure to foreclosure of many trou~bled financial institutions by reducing the loan to value ratios on
overfmanced properties.
Thus, the elimination of a capital formation vehicle which provides additional funds to many unstable financial institutions
would also be an undesirable effect of any such proposal if approved by this committee.
Although RESSI and NAR believe that the present tax treatment of MLPs and other limited partnerships is appropria~ we
feel even more strongly that the current treatment of real estate
MLPs and other limited partnerships predominantly investing in
real estate should be retamed.
Corporation taxation of real estate MLPs and other partnerships
can only be characterized as a new tax increase levied on real
estate, and not as an attempt to preserve the corporate revenue
base, as some, including the Treasury, have claimed.
The limited partnership was the traditional investment vehicle
-for investment real estate before tax reform and has continued
since. No significant portion of investment real estate has ever
been within the corporate tax base and the idea that MLPs and
other limited partnerships are removing investment real estate
from the corporate tax base should be regarded 88 a misconception.
,T reasury statistics released yesterday indicate that a significant
proportion of MLPs formed in 1986 and 1987 88 a result of liquidations and rollouts, the so-called disincorporation problem. Most of
those rollouts relating to real estate entities involve real estate developed for sale rather than investment. In addition, last year's
repeal of the General Utilities Doctrine now assesses tax on the removal of these assets from the corporate tax base.
Consequently, corporate classification of MLPs and other limited
partnerships owning investment real estate would constitute a new
tax on investment real estate, in addition to the estimated $50 to
$60 billion that was assessed, we feel disproportionately, in the
1986 Tax Reform Act.
Finally, we oppose the Treasury's proposals for withholding at
the partnership level. This proposal improperly shifts the self-compliance burden from the taxpayer to the partnership. Further, the
inexact nature of such withholding would create 88 much administrative burden as the Tredsury feels it would eliminate, due to new
reporting requirements at both the partnership and partner levels.
In summary, we recommend that this subcommittee retain the
tax treatment of MLPs and other limited partnerships. We stand in
opposition to proposals to subject limited partnerships to the corpo-
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rate tax or corporate minimum tax or to subject limited partners to
certain aspects of the corporate mjnjmum tax.
Further, we think that proposals to withhold tax at the limited
partnership level are inappropriate and ineffective with respect to
reducing administrative burden.
Thank you.
Mrs. KENNELLY. Thank you, Mr. Rosenthal.
[The statement of Mr. Rosenthal follows:]
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Statement of Jeffrey R. Rosenthal, National Association of Realtors
My name is Jeff Rosenthal. I am a partner in the Chicago office of Peat.
Marwick. Main & Co. I am testifying on behalf of the NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF
REALTORS® and the Real Estate Securities and Syndication Institute (RESSI).
which is an affiliate of the REALTORS organization. The N~RAL ASSOCIATION
OF REALTORS® is an umbrella organization consisting of 750.000 members with
interests that span the breadth of real estate activities. including the
ownership, operation, management. development, appraisal. and sale of single
family residences and commercial real estate, including both residential and
non-residential structures. RESSI represents 3,000 individuals and corporate
members who specialize in investment and management of income-producing real
estate and mortgage loans as well as the creation, issuance, analysis, and
management of real estate securities. The group real estate investment
programs in which these individuals are involved range from relatively small
private placements of undeveloped land to multi-million dollar group real
estate investment programs involving large real estate complexes. Many of the
offerings in the post-tax reform era are designed to attract middle-income
investors by offering units priced between $1,000-$5,000 for investment
opportunities in diversified mortgage loans and/or the ownership of rental
real estate.
My statement is organized and presented in the following manner. First, I
shall summarize the recommendations tha~ RESSI and the NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF
REALTORS® would like this Subcommittee and the Congress as a whole to consider
in connection with its study of pass-through entities and MLPs. Secondly, I
shall discuss in detail the reasons underlying our contention that the current
tax treatment of both limited partnerships generally and of limited
partnerships which own or make mortgage loans on rental real estate are
appropriate and should be maintained. Thirdly, I shall resp~nd to suggestions
appearing in recent publications and articles arguing for the creation of a
model pass-through entity to replace the partnership as an investment vehicle
for real estate. And finally, I have prepared an analys1.s of recent
suggestions that the entity classification rules should be replaced with a new
stan~ard that accentuates the importance of the limited liability test to the
exclusion of other factors that are currently applied under existing Treasury
rt!gulations.
I.

Summary of ReCOmmendations to this Subcommittee:

A. The tax treatment of limited partnerships as a pass-through entity
under present law should be maintained. including the tax treatment of Master
Limited Partnerships (MLPs). A Master Limited Partnership or MLP is defined
as a limited partnership (formed pursuant to the laws of any state) having
equity securities which are registered under the Securities Act of 1933 and
are either (i) traded on a national securities exchange registered under the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 or (ii) designated as national market system
securities pursuant to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the rules and
regulations adopted thereunder. SUC!l securities are hereinafter called
"Listed Securities." Simply stated, an MLP is a partnership that has been
publicly offered and has Listed Securities.
The tax treatment of partnerships, including MLPs. should be maintained as
an effective capital formation technique to attract investor capital and
particularly middle-income investor capital. As the ensuing discussion more
clearly indicates, MLPs have been designed to appeal to wage-earners with
annual incomes as low as $25,000 by offering Listed Securities priced between
$1.000 to $5,000. Moreover, passage of the 1986 Tax Refvra Act has adequately
addressed any perceived abuses that may have previously existed. Revisions to
the tax rules concerning entity classification. including partnerships and
MLPs, are not warranted. If Congress makes a determination. as some have
suggested, that the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 should not be reopened for a
period of time in order to fairly evaluate the effects of the last two Tax
Reform Bills on the nation's economy, then this rationale should also apply to
the present tax treatm~nt of Master Limited Partnerships.
B. Although RESSI and th~ NAtIONAL ASSOCIATION OF REALTORS- believe ~hat
the present tax treatment of MLPS as a partnership is appropriate. we feel
very strongly that the current treatment of MLPS predominantly owning ren~

real estate or making mortgage loans on rental real estate should be
retained. Otherwise. decisions by the Congress to tax real estate MLPs as
corporations can only be characterized as a new tax increase levied on real
estate. and not as an attempt to preserve the corporate revenue base. as some
have claimed. The limited partners~_was the traditional investment vehicle
used for the acquisition of rental real estate before the advent of tax reform
and this practice has continued subsequent to the passage of that
legislation. Consequently, legislation to terminate the use of MLPs owning
investment real estate would constitute a new tax on investment real estate,
which would be in addition to the estimated 50 to 60 billion dollars over a
five year period that was assessed on investment real estate in the 1986 Tax
Reform Act.
C. If the Congress acts to curb the use of MLPs. including MLPs that
principally own rental real estate and/or make mortgage lOanS on rental real
estate. any proposed restrictions should apply only to MLPS as defined above.
Any proposal passed by Congress reclassifying ftLPs for tax purposes should
nevertheless continue to permit partnership taxation for limited partnerships
which are either publicly offered or non-publicly offered and do not have
Listed Securities. Any proposal to restrict KLPs that ltmits the use of
limited partnerships that do not have Listed Securities and are formed to
invest in real estate would deal a crippling blow to investment real estate.
the effects of which are magnified by the impact of tax reform. A proposal to
tax as a corporation a limited partnership which does not have Listed
Securities and which owns real estate and/or holds mortgage loans on real
estate would cause real estate limited partnerships to be uncompetltive with
alternative forms of investments by dr:stieally r~due!ng the yield from such
investments through imposition of the corporate tax. Moreover. the costs to
the economy and to the real estate industry of another significant tax
increase on real estate would be quite d aging in terms of higher
unemployment for the construction industry. which is only now coming to grips
with the adverse effects of tax reform. A new tax would also have an
especially harsh effect on a capital-intensive industry. such as real estate.
with a concommitantly detrimental impact on this country's GNP to which real
estate contributes roughly 40% annually.
D. If the Congress decides to consolidate all pass-through entities. such
as limited partnerships. RICs. REnICs. or BElTs. into a pode! pass-through
entity that would more closelv reSemble a BElT. as s OWe have suggested. then
many of the restrictions governing the qualification test and the asset
investment rules currently applicable to BElTs must be relaxed in order to
provide the entity with the flexibility (which BElTs currently lack and that
partnerships possess) that is essenti.l to meet the diverse needs of today's
investors in a sophisticated re.l est.te m.rket. It should be noted that
Congress recognized this need for flexibility in certain re.l estate
investments when it .dopted the RtMIC as an investment vehicle for
mortgage-backed securities.
II. REASONS IN SUPPORT OF RECOMMENDAtIONS
A. A Proposal to Tax Real Estate MLPS as CorporatiQns Cannot Be Just i fied
as Necessary to Preserve the Corporate Revenue Base. But Instead Represents a
New Tax on Investment Real Estate.
Because investment real est.te w.s held in limited partnership form before
the p.ss.ge of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 and continues to be held primarily
through limite~ partnerships, a propos.l of a legislative or regulatory nature
to classifY limited partnerships with predominantly real estate interests as
corporations for tax purposes would represent a new, substantial tax increase
on the real estate industry. lnvestlents in rental real estate w,re never a
significant part of the GQrpQrate revenue base before passage of tax refoga
and has remained outside of the corporate revenue b.se after its enactment,
Thus. efforts to tax real estate MLPs as corporations and not as partnerships
for tax purposes cannot be justified on the grounds that such .ctions are
necessary to preserve the cQrporate revenue b.se.
A new tax on re.l estate in the fQrm of taxing re.l estate MLPs as
corporations for tax purposes would be in addition to the estimated 50 to 60
billion doll.r tax increase which the re.l estate industry paid for the
individual and ~orporate rate reductions contained in the Tax Reform Act of
1986. These tax incre.ses cQnsist Qf • combination of various provisions,
including: the pa.sive los. limitation that limits the deductibility of
p••• ive losses to the income from p••sive activities. which is d~fined by
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statute to include rental real estate; restrictive investment interest rules
which significantly limit the deductibility of interest incurred to purchase
investment assets, including real estate; reduced depreciation deductions for
structures; revisions to the at risk rules; less generous tax incentives for
the rehabili ~ion of historic structures and older buildings; and less
attractive tax-exempt bond financing rules pertaining to multi-family housing,
among others. The point to emphasize is that the real estate industry , and
especially investment real estate, paid a disproportionate share of the tax
increases contained in the Tax Reform Act of 198 6 to achieve the tax rate
reductions for individuals and corporations.
Although it can be argued that legislation to restrict the use of ML?s may
be warranted in those instances where an active trade or business
disincorporates or chooses the partnership vehicle simply to esc a~e :~~
corporate tax, this rationale cannot be cited as au t ho r ity for t &X.r. a
limited partnership that owns investment real estate as a c c r pO r &~~zL. t J r o~p
ownership of and mortgage loans on rental real esta te have tr ad i:!j;-;a:::- ::f!~:-.
made through a limited. partnership and this practice r
1ns unaffe:::e::1 ~:.' - ax
reform. Moreover, the repeal in the Tax Reform Ac t of 1986 o f t.1! ~
Utilities doctrine, which allowed tax-free corporate l iquidat io ns, r. c~
predominantly causes the costs in additional taxes of liquidat iog ..
corporation to be more expensive than the savings ach ie ved thr oUAh .vo.~a nce
of double taxation. The reasons for the use of the l imited pa rtnership b y the
real estate industry are diverse, including both tax an.d non-t ax factors . The
major tax reason for the selection of a limi ted partnership as the pr incipa l
investment vehicle for real estate is the flow-through nature of a p" rtne r ship
for tax purposes. Under the law that existed prior to the TLx Reform Ac t o f
1986, the partnership vehicle provided partners with the ability to apply
their prorata share of tax losses from the partnership investment agains t
other income on their individual tax return and to pay only a singl e t ax on
any taxable income of the partnership. After tax reform, which repealed t ax
incentive& for real estate, the most popular inv~ODent vehicle for rental
real estate remains the partnership, due to the existence not only of only a
single tax on partnership income, but also in response to t he new r ules
imposed on real estate investments by tax reform.
In recent years, a new, larger publicly-offered, partnership having Listed
Securities called the Master Limited Partnership (MLP) as defined above has
been utilized to attract investment in a wide range of ac tivities. including
oil and gas, real estate, and other investmellts. HLPs provide the opportunity
for diversification of investments to middle-income. smaller investors who
have previously been denied access to the breadth of investment possibilities
available to wealthier investors. MLPs are to be contrasted with other
limited partnerships (including publicly offered partnerships). t hat do not
have Listed Securities. MLPs began to be used in late 1984 and have grown in
popularity in the last few years. The reasons for the surge in ftLP activity
vary with the nature of the industry and the type of investment involved. In
the case of investment real estate, the MLP has gained prominence as a means
of attracting equity capital to acquire. or construct. large residential and
commercial facilities that otherwise would be beyond the reaCh of th~
middle-income investor.
A second major reason for the development of ftLPs is to use the equi ty
capital provided by investors to reduce or retire the ou tstanding indebtedness
on existing partnership properties or to acquire unleveraged or low-leveraged
real estate. Use of the HLP to acquire rental rea l estate with l ess leverage
or to retire existing indebtedness on rental properties is in direct response
to the anti-debt policy of the Tax Reform Act of 1986. Of particu1ar
importance is the fact that KLPs that own renta1 real estate do not pose a
threat to the corporate revenue base. Whether or not the partnership is an
MLP that represents a roll-up or a consolidation of existing rental properties
or the acqUisition of new properties. rental real estate vas previously and
currently is owned by limited partnerships in the vast majority of group
investment situations.
Moreover. the use of investors' equity capital to buy new properties
without leverage or with low leverage or to reduce the outstanding
indebtedness on partnership properties in real estate KLPs allows the investor
to obtain a higher yield by i mproving the cash flow of the partnership through
reduced debt service. In the present investment climate, industry officials
believe that a 10% to 12% annual yield is necessary to compete wi~h
.
alternative forms of investment and that such a return cannot be attained
without significant debt reduction or retirement. Typically, real estate
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investments without the tax incentives of prior law and with substantial
indebtedness on the properties would have achieved an initial yield of 6%,
which would make them uncompetiti'le witL .;~ >.. al funds and equity stocks in the
current marketplace. Additionally. the reduction or retirement of outstanding
indebtedness on rental real estate, which MLPs tend to ~nhance, has the
salutary effect of reducing the exposure to financial institutions of troubled
loans through the modification of 95% leveraged lo~~ to BOX or less. Thus,
not only does the retirement of debt on existing partnership properties
through the use of MLPs serve to make real estate competitive with alternative
investment choices, but these actions are also consistent with the legis l ative
intent behind the adoption by Congress of t he inve~tment interest revisions
and the passive loss limitation, whiCh were designed to discourage
debt-financed purchases of property.
A number of press reports during the past seve ral months have attributed
the growth of MLPs to the nep.d that many investors have for large amounts of
passive income to offset unused passive losses under the new passive loss
limitation. While this explanation may hold true in a limited number of
cases, its impcrtance to the growth of real estate MLPs is greatly
overstated. The offering materials for real estate MLPs sold during t he last
12 months contain strongly ~orded caveats cautioning prospectiv~ inVestors
that either Treasury regulation or legislative action may recharacterize or
reclassify the income from MLPs not as passive incQ e , but rathe r as
investment income that Cbnnot be offset by passive losses. The primary =eason
for the growth of real estate MLPs lies in the relatively high yields that
they are offering investors. Current yields from real esta te MLPs have
frequently ranged between 10 to 12 percent, which makes them competitive with
other investment choices available to today's investor. Mo reover, t he growth
in MLPs would appear to be entirely consistent with the intent of Congress in
encouraging economically-oriented transactions while eliminating tax-mo tivated
deals through adoption of the passive loss limitation. In short, MLPs are not
designed to produce tax losses, but instead are structured t o generate
subst~tial cash flow for investors.
As Congress approaches the issue of how to address the tax treatment of
MLPs, the important point to reiterate is that real estate is not seeking to
avoid the corporate income tax through the use of KLPs. Real estate has
rarely chosen the corporate form of ownership, either before or after tax
reform. While industries other than real estate may choose the HLP as a means
of converting income distributions to the shareholders or bondholders from
portfolio income, such as dividends and interest, into passive income by
reliance on a statutory provision that deems all income from a limited
partnership to be passive income (subject to Treasury regulations ) , this
statement does not extend to real es~ate KLPs.
Not only have rental real estate and mo rtgage loans on rental real estate
traditionally operated in partnership form, but the statute specificall y
defines rental real estate to be a passive activity that generates passive
income, irrespective of whether t~e property is held by a sole proprietor, an
investor, or partnership. Accordingly, the creation of real estate KLPs to
produce cash flow characterized as passive income is not a subversion o~ the
statutory intent behind the passive loss provision, which was to treat rental
inco~ as passive regardless of the form in which the property is owned.
The
use of a limited partnership or KLP to invest in rental real estate should not
alter that result, when !nY trade or business income from a limited
partnership is generally treated as passive income by statute.
Finally. there have been comments appearing in recent tax publications
alluding to the administrative problems arising from the operation of an KLP.
As a member of Peat, Marvick, Main & Co., with practical, ongoing experience
in the area of limited partnerships and KLPs. I believe that the problems of
~~i~istration attributed to KLPs are exaggerated.
"ost Big Eight Accounting
firms have developed programs and internal systems that adequately address the
recordkeeping concerns and compliance problems of administering an KLP.
Moreover, the nominee reporting rules contained in the 1986 Tax Reform Act
address many of the concerns regarding tax compliance and administralion of
MLPs. In short. Congress should not take action restricting KLPs in an effort
to combat a problem that has already been reduced to mana&eable proportions.
B.

Although RESSI and the National Association of Realtors firmly believe
law tax treatment of MLPS shouid be maintained. we feel even
.trongly that anY proposal adopted by Congress should not apply to

~the pre8~nt
~
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limited partnerships that do not have Listed Securities.
position are listed below:

The reasons for this

First, if the Congress decides to tax MLP~ as corporations because the
interests of MLPs are Listed Securities, this rationale does not apply to
interests in limited partnerships that do not have Listed Securities.
Interests in limited partnerships that do not have Listed Securities are not
liquid and are subject to numerous restrictions on their transferability. In
1986, for example, less than one percent of the units in public or non-public
limited partnerships, which do not have Listed Securities, were sold for
value. In many cases, a limited partner who wishes to sell his interest in a
partnership must obtain the consent of and grant the right of first refusal to
the general partner. Moreover, often a transferee must meet an original
investor's suitability requirements and/or obtain regulatory approval. In
short. an investment in a publicly-registered limited partnership contrasts
sharply with an interest in an MLP based on the liquidity or lack thereof of
the investment.
Secondly. imposition of a corporate tax on publicly-registered limited
partnerships would reduce the yield from investments to such a degree that use
of the partnership as an investment vehicle would be inappropriate in most
instances. Yet, the limited partnership is the only investment vehicle
currently available under our present tax system with sufficient flexibility
to attract investor capital, especially middle incoce investors, in the
post-tax reform era. A recent article in the Wall Street JOUrnal (June 11.
1987) correctly observed that public partnerships are presently being offered
in small denominations, such as $1,000, in order to attract middle income
investor capital to the market. Many investors have annual incomes as low as
$25.000. The article fur,ther points out that the real estate acquisitions
being made by such partnerships are of a low-risk, low-leveraged variety,
because middle-income investors cannot afford to take undue risks. Once
again, the growth of real estate limited partnerships that offer the small
investor the opportunity to obtain a high yield from an investment realizes
the goal of Congress in the 1986 Tax Refona Act to encourage
economically-sound transactions. Furthermore, such partnerships offer the
investor the ability to invest in major projects, such as apartments, shopping
centers, hotels, commercial office buildings, resort communities, and other
real estate investments of a magnitude that would be unavailable to the
investor without group investment. In addition, the article observed that
non-public, private placement offerings which are generally offered to wealthy
investors in real estate have declined precipitously since passage of the tax
reform bill. Private placement offerings tended to be those that provided
investors with substantial ta~ benefits which are no longer available after -tax reform. Specifically, The Stanger Report projects total private
partnerships sales of roughly $1.5 billion for all of 1987, which is a
substantial decline from the $3.5 billion in private placement capital raised
in 1986.
C. The Partnership is the Sole Investment Vehicle with the Flexibility to
Meet the Diverse Needs of Real Estate Investors, Developer~, Lenders. and
Borrowers.
Flexibility has always been the hallmark of the partnership as an
investment vehicle that distinguish~d it from other forms of investment. The
partnership as an investment vehicle provides optimal flexibility to meet the
diverse needs of a wide range of investors in a sophisticated real estate
market. To illustrate, in a typical real estate transaction, a pricrity
distribution of a specified amount can be provided to a person or entity
contributing substantial capital to the development of a real estate project.
while another investor can receive a higher percentage of cash flow remaining
in exeess of the priority distribution. A permanent lender may receive a
percentage of the eeonomic appreciation on the sale of the property. The
general partner may receive a percentage of the economic appreciation on the
sale of the projeet subordinated to a specified return to investors and may
also reeeive a different pereentage of the cas~ flow during the operation of
the property. These alloeations are also important for economic, non-tax
reasons, beeause they provide a means for incentive compensation to developers
and others active in the real estate ~usiness. This degree of flexibility is
unattainable with any other alternative fOnD of investment vehicle.
What this exampl~ illustrates is that neither a corporation nor a REIT can
vary the pereentage of ownership for each equity owner in different items of
ineome, 10s8, lain, and caah distributions while a par~n~rship possesses the
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ability to alter allocations of income, loss, gain, and cash distributions, to
meet the needs vf various participants to a real estate transaction. While
special allocations of income and loss have tax ramifications that produce
different tax results for various partners to a partnership transaction, the
recently finalized regulations under Section 704(b) mandate that such
allocations must h~ve substantial economic effect if they are to be recognized
for tax purposes. Consequently, the potential for abuse of the tAX laws under
the special allocation provisions of the Federal income tax laws ~re ne~ ~ ted
to a large degree. The important point to emphasize is that special
allocations are utilized in a partnership agreement, especially in the
post-tax reform era, primarily to meet the business needs of the parties and
not to achieve tax objectives.
D. Imposition of a corporate tax on real estate limited partnerships that
do not have Listed Securities would discourage group investment in rental real
estate by drastically reducing the yield from such investments.
Information furnished by the industry indicates that partnerships
specializing in real estate have prospered during 1981, because the real
estate industry responded to the impact of tax reform by structuring
transactions to meet the needs of today's investors. Real estate limited
partnerships are raising equity capital from investors to acquire additional
properties or to retire or reduce existing debt. Thus, real estate offerings
have moved away from the traditional use of-teveraging and high debt financing
to a mark~t in which equity capital or low leverage furnishes much of the
resources necessary to finance the development or acquisition of rental
properties. Moreover, continuing the trend that began after passage of the
1984 tax bill, the real estate industry has offered the investor, thr~ugh use
of the real estate limited partnership, a viable entity that provides the
potential for significant cash flow and economic appreciation by reducing the
debt service on existing properties and financing the purchase and
construction of new properties. By the attraction of investor equity or low
leveraged capital, as well as through a reduction of varioUs fees Charged by
the promoter and syndicator, the real estate industry has been able in recent
years to provide more attractive yields to investors on rental real estate
investments, which make real estate competitive in the marketplace with
alternative choices.

inve:t:::~rfr!:PaS~~!~edfp:r~n~~s~:~et::: dle!h:o~a::v!1~7s~!das;::;it:!:te
wo~ld

reduce the yield from the investment to such a degree that a real estate
investment would no longer be competitive with other investment
possibilities. This is especially true for retirement planS which represent a
growing segment of the real estate inyestpent market. Statistically, the
share of equity capital provided by retirement plans, especially ...11
retirement plans, has risen at an increasing rate over the last several
years. Because such plans, such as pension funds, are tax-exempt entities,
investments by pension managers are made on the basis of annual yield and
economic appreciation and not because of tax incentives. In 1986, more than
60% of the $8.4 billion raised in equity capital through public offerings of
real estate limited partnerships, was funded by retirement plans, whereas the
percentage of equity capital furnished by such plans in 1982 was only 50%.
An even more positive development for the real estate investment market in
recent years has been the tendency of retirement plans~ especially the smaller
plans. to diversify their .investDent portfolios by placing a hiaher percentage
of their assets in real estate. Previously, asset aanaaers for retirement
plans generally followed a conservative investment policy that directed plan
assets primarily into stocks and bonds. ERISA encourages retirement plans to
diversify their assets, which should appropriately include investaents in
real eatate. The group real estate investment industry has created liaited
partnership investment opportunities to enable retirement plans to invest in
real estate. Recent studies have shown that a more diversified investment
plan for retirement plans, including a hiaher percenta,e of investment in real
estate assets, would hale produced a sianificantly hiaher yield for retirement
beneficiaries than their actual investment decisions produced. For exaaple,
du=ina the eleven year period from 1972 throuah 1982, the financial return for
real estate investments wa. ll~ in comparison to 7.7~ for ca.mon stocks. The
yield to retirees and pension beneficiaries would have increased to 8.5% from
7.7% if the institutional mana,ers of pension funds had invested 20% of their
a.sets in real estate and only 80% in common stock as opposed to the actual
percentage of only 3~ or le8s ,nvested in real estate durina that same period.
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However. the current trend for retirement plans. especially smaller plans.
to invest more resources in limited partnerships that do not have Listed
Securities would quickly be reversed if a corporate tax is levied on th~
incOme of such partnerships. If that eventuality were to occur, payment of
the corporate tax would consume too much of the cash flow from the real estate
investments made through. the partnership to allow such investments to be
competitive with alternative choices available to individual retirement
accounts or pension managers for retirement plans, whose primary
responsibility is to achieve 8. yield sufficient to meet the retirement income
needs of their beneficiaries. In fact, many pension managers would eschew
investments in real estate limited partnerships that were reclassified as
corporations for tax purposes simply because the corporate tax was imposed,
irrespective of the economics of the transaction or the amount of the tax.
Thus, the movement by pension managers towards diversification of the
investment portfolio would be brought to a screeching halt, which would be to
the detriment of the overall yield attained by retirement income beneficiaries
and to the further dismay of the real estate industry. "ore~ver, not only
would the yield from real estate investments made by limited partnerships be
drastically lowered by reason of the imposition of a corporate t~, but the
economic appreciation of interests in real estate limited partnerships that do
not have Listed Securities would be reduced by reason of the lower income
stream available to investors.
E. If the Congress decides to adopt a model pass-through entity for all
types of investments. in lieu of all existing pass-through entities. including
the limi~ partnership. then the model pass-through entity must contain the
flexibility which oartnerships possess under current law.
During its consideration of the proper tax treatment to be accorded
pass-through entities under the federal income tax system, if the Congress
decides to consolidate all pass-through entities, including limited
partnerships, RICs, REITs, and REMICs. into a single. model pass-through
entity that more closely resembles i REIT than any other flow-through vehicle,
then we would 4ecommend that such an entity be granted the flexibility which
the partnership possesses and which the other investment Vehicles, the REIT,
the corporation, and the S corporation, lack.
Under present law, a partnership agreement can be drafted with the
flexibility necessary to meet the individual needs of particular partners.
The flexibility to adopt these features is not present under existing law in
eith,r a REIT, a RIC, a REMIC, an S corporation, or an ordinary corporation.
In order to make the REIT a more attractive vehicle for real estate
investment, substantial revisions are required to the rules governing both the
qualification of REITs and the investment of REIT assets in addition to the
changes made to the REIT rules in the 1986 Tax Reform Act. If additional
changes are made to the REIT provisions allowing for this flexibility, then
such a hypothetical REIT would approximate the tax treatment of limited
partnerships after tax reform, which limits the deductions irom passive
activities to the income from such investments. Certainly, one change that
should be immediately adopted is to treat the income distributed by a REIT as
passive income instead of as portfolio income which is presently the case.
This revision would merely conform the character of income from a REIT to that
of income from a limited partnership owning rental real estate •• However, if
these changes are not made, then the REIT as an investment vehicle is too
inflexible to attract anything but a small percentage of the total investment
capital currently invested in rental real estate. In the absence of a viable
investment vehicle to meet the needs of today's real estate investor, the
implications for the real estate .'.ndustry would be ominous.
Even more significant revisions would be required to cause the corporation
to be an attractive investment vehitle for rental real estate. Apart from the
adverse feature of double taxation, :he corporation can only offer common or
preferred stock to its shareholders (r debentures to its lenders. A
corporation does not possess the flexibility to provide different shareholders
with varying percentages in different layers of income and loss associated
with corporate assets. If the S Corp)ration is Chosen to be a candidate for a
model pass-through entity, then its rl1es must also be substantially revised.
These revisions would be in addition co the changes made in the 1982
legislation regarding S Corporations. Current rules allowing S corporation
status only where a corporation has 35 or fewer shareholders ~ust be relaxed.
Additional revisions that would be required to make S Corporations a suitable
vehicle for real estate investment ilclude revisions to the ~asis rules
governing the basis that a shareholdfr in an S Corporation has in his stock
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and the rules must also be overhauled regarding the percentage of p~ssive
income that an S Corporation can have without disqualification. A further
drawback to the use of an S corporation as an alternative to a limited
partnership for real estate investment 1s the fact that many states, including
California, do not recognize the existence of an S corporation under their
state income tax laws. In those states, the effect is that the income of the
S corporation is subject to the state corporate income tax, which
substantiallY reduces the yield in those states.
F . Comments on Suggested Revisions to the Entity Cl assificat i on Rules
Recently, there have been a number of proposals to revise the rules
governing the appropriate classification of an entity, including a limited
partnership, under the Federal Income tax laws.
Under Treasury Regulations, (Section 301.7701-3), partnerships are
distinguished from corporations by determining whether four corporate
characteristics apply to the entity in question. These corporate
characteristics are continuity of life, centralized ' anagement, limited
liability, and free transferability of interests. Under these r ules, an
entity is taxed as a partnership for tax purposes if it possesses no more than
two of these attributes absent other factors indicating corporate
classification. If an entity possesses more thL~ two of these
characteristics, it is taxed as a corporation.
In one such article, it was suggested that the entity classification rules
be revised to include only one criterion, whi~h would require an entity to
pass a vastly expanded test of unlimited liability in order to warrant
classification as a partnership for tax purposes. These suggested revisions
to the characteristic of limited liability would cause an entity to be taxed
as a corporatio~, whether or not the business was conducted in partnership
form, if either the partnership did not have general partners with a net worth
(excluding the value of partnership property) at least equal to the
outstanding liabilities of the part~ership Qr if less than a substantial
amount of the partnership liabilities are not on a recourse basis for which a
partner(s) has personal liability. If both tests are met, the entity woul d be
taxed as a partnership, but only the general partners with exposure to
liability would be allocated the tax losses of the partnership.
This approach, if implemented, would cause serious disruption to
investment real estate and would raise more questions than it answers.
First, if the general partner must have a net worth at least equal to the
amount of partnership liabilities without taking into account the value of the
underlying collateral, then virtually no real estate partnership would be
taxed as a partnership. Few, if any, general partners in real estate
developments have sufficient net worth to equal the amount of outstanding
partnership debt without regard to the value of partnership property.
Moreover, it is inequitable to assume that the partnership assets have no
value in determining whether one or more partners have a net worth adequate to
cover partnership debt. In addition, if the net worth of one or more partners
must equal the amount of debt incurred by a partnership owning rental rea~
estate in order for the partnership to avoid the corporate tax, then why
should such a test be applied only to partnerships? Would such a test also
require individual owners to have a net worth equal to the amount of debt on
the rental property to avoid corporate taxation without including the value of
the property?
Secondly, even if one or more general partners has a net worth equal tc
partnership liabilities excluding the value of partnership property, the
proposed test would tax the partnership as a corporation if more than an
insubstantial amount of the partnership debt were nonrecourse in nature. Such
an approach would cause a drastic overhaul of the prevailing use by lenders of
nonrecourse financing on both residential and nonresidentisl rental
pro~erties.
In the typical situation, a construction loan for the development
of rental real estate will be a recourse loan for the simple reason that
collateral does not exist to reassure lenders until construction is
complet~d.
When the structure is placed in service, the permanent lender
provides a nonrecourse loan to take out the construction lender and secure
repayment of the loan with the property. It should be noted that lenders Who
arrange nonrecourse loans do not do so to further the tax objectives of the
borrower, but because they have collateral in the structure that equals or
exceeds the outstanding debt owed them by the borrower. Moreover, many
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states, including California, mandate the use of nonrecourse financing in a
number of real estate transactions. Furthermore. the question must be asked,
if the presence of a significant amount of nonrecourse indebtedness on
partnership property causes the partnership to be taxed as a corporation. why
shou l d this test not also be applied to individual owners of rental property.
causing them to be subject to the corporate tax. if their property is financed
with a nonrecourse loan.
And finally. the proposal would require partnership tax losses to be
allocated exclusively to those partners with unl i it ed liability even if the
net worth and recourse liability tests were met. This aspect of the proposal
would require a substantial rewriting of the special allocation provisions of
Section 704(b) of present law. Treasury regulations. which were recently
finalized under Section 704(b), require substantial ec ono~l c effort in order
for allocations of income and loss that are contrary to the g ~ner al profit and
loss ratio to be respected for tax purposes. Most tax expert s believe that
the final regulations address the potential abuses of nonecono !c ,
tax-motivated allocations under prior law. Also, the proposal only suggests
that t-ax losses be allocated to partners bearing the risk of loss. but does
not discuss the a~location of income. Would income follow loss allocations
for tax purposes or would it be allccated under a different f ormula?
Moreover. such a proposal would be contrary to the widely ~ccepte d view
reflected in the 704(b) regulations that those investors who ay lose cap i tal
in a transaction should be entitled to a deductible loss f ro the ir economic
investments.
CONCLUS I ali
To summarize. both RESSI and the NATIONAL ASSOCIATICN OF F£ALIORse
strongly believe that the present entity classification rule3 should not be
changed and that the current tax treatment of partnerships, includ i ng MLPs,
should be maintained. The Tax Reform Act of 1986, which repealed or greatly
curtailed tax incentives for real estate investment, has adequately addressed
any perceived tax abuses. Revisions to the entity classification rules are
ur~ecessary and would be a case of overkill at a time when the real estate
industry is adapting to the effects of tax reform.
If Congress is of a different view, we urge you to target the perceived
abuses only and not to adopt a sweeping proposal that could have devastating
effects on the real estate industry. which already is in a period of
transition after tax reform. RESSI and the NATIO~AL ASSOCIATION OF REALTORS®
stand ready to work with the tax-writing Committees of Congress in drafting
appropriate legislation, or to answer any questions that you may have.
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Mrs. KENNELLY. Mr. Lee, you mentioned that material participation is an important criteria that this committee should address.
Do you think that is more important than whether the business
conducted-by the organization is an active business that traditionally has been a corporation?
Mr. LEE. I think those are two different questions. First is in
terms of an entity versus aggregate approach, material participation is the question. In terms of now we have something that the
people don't materially participate in and therefore it has to be an
entity, at that point when we determine whether we can have a
passthrough and, if we do, what level of taxation is carried, only
the active business/passive investor should be carrying this corporate --sector tax I have been talking about.
If it is passive business/passive investor, then it should be a separate entity, but should probably be able to pass through at the regular individual rates, much like an S corporation is what it would
look like.
But if the enterprise is active business/passive investor, then in
1986 you decided that it carry, say $220 billion; and we can't let
that type of active business/passive investors go into a different
plastic wrapping and not carry that burden.
So it is both.
Mrs. KENNELLY. Would you agree, Mr. Wilson?
Mr. WILSON. My comment revolves around the inequity of taxing
a partn~rship because you bring in public unit holders and it is patently u'nfair, just because in our case we have sold some of our
units to individual unit holders, that the whole partnership should
be taxed.
However, I think that there is a position-this morning there
was some question raised by someone-I can't remember who it
was, one of the Congressmen-concerning how to get around this
question.
I would think that the following would probably be a solution,
while it is not an acceptable solution to everyone-I would think
that a partnership should not be taxed as a corporation just because it has a public shareholder, but when it decides to make a
decision to sell shares to the public, when it makes that threshold
decision, they have to consider that the distributions are going to
be portfolio distributions as opposed to the possibility of them being
considered otherwise.
Now, the Treasury has this power now-this Congress gave the
Treasury that kind of power and, in my opinion, that might be a
place where it can be applied, in other words, to warn all the
people in the industry, when you decide to sell public units of a
partnership, you are automatically going to be considered to be
portfolio income.
When that is known, then that decision will be made and taken
into account before they go public.
But I just believe that what we are considering now is wrong. I
will liken it to this. Loopholes for taxing are just as bad as loopholes for not taxing. What is being considered right now is creating
a loophole for taxing a particular entity because a public unit
holder has bought a share of the unit. It just defies logic as to why
that is equitable, why it is fair.
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However, another alternative is once the enterprise is public, its
distribution is then portfolio income. ·I think there might be merits
to that. I personally think that there is a lot more merit to that
than what we are considering right now.
Mrs. KENNELLY. Maybe I could ask Mr. Sandler or Mr. Wilson to
comment on another suggestion by Professor Lee that single tax
treatment should only be allowed to organizations in which investors materially participate in a venture.
I think you suggested, Mit. Le....
e-Mr. LEE. What I said-Mrs. KENNELLY [continuing]. That a single tax treatment should
only be allowed to organizations in which investors materially participate.
Mr. LEE. What I said was aggregate, which means you are treating the partner or the shareholder as if they own the underlying
property and automatically pass it through. That should only apply
when you materially participate.
If you do not materially participate, there could be a single tax.
But the framework would be like Secretary Mentz suggested a year
ago, that all S's and K's be taxed, all subchapter S's and partnerships, be taxed much like subchapter S's.
.l
That would be Treasury's model that would be available if you
did materially participate. You would be more like an S corporation, even if you were a partnership.
The next question becomes: Do we, if you are a separate entity,
allow you to pass through, and that would be under $100,000, sure,
no problem. Over $100,000 we begin to get into the corporate sector
area and, if you are going to allow them to pass through, it could
be a single tax but not a single tax at 28 percent, the individual
rate, on an eroded corporate tax base. It would have to be 28· percent on economic income or, say, 45 percent on the eroded base.
Mrs. KENNELLY. I was going to ask Mr. Sandler and Mr. Wilson,
aren't we complicating this to such an extent that we have done
away with people making the decision anyway?
Mr. SANDLER. I think that the distinction-we are trying to make
a distinction between who are the active or passive investors in a partnership format. Academically it may be sound, but I think as a
practical matter it would be very difficult to determine.
I have been a general partner in small -partnerships where we
had ten investors. I am now individually a general partner in a
master limited partnership where we have thousands of investors.
The little old man or little old lad~ho has her 100,000 shares
or depositary receipts in Southwest
ty .takes a very active interest in the management of our business and doesn't hesitate to
call and tell us what to do. To the contrary, the large investor,
when I had a partnership in which we had ten large, very sophisticated investors, tended not to take an active role.
So although it sounds good, I don't know how you would make
that determination-certainly not on size, because I think that is
artificial, just as I think it is artificial as to what kind of business
the entity is engaged in. You should treat all partnerships the
same, whether they are in one kind of- business or the other, all
partnerships the same regardless of the number of people in them.
Mrs. KENNELLY. You agree with Mr. Wilson on that?

81 - 926 0 - 8B - 13

374

Mr. SANDLER. Yes.
Mrs. KENNELLY. Mr. Wilson?
Mr. WILSON. I would like to point out something. We are in t he
home-building, land development, building of apartments and so
forth. Somebody this morning raiSed th e question about a level
playing field.
Mrs. KENNELLY. They always do.
Mr. WILSON. I would like to point out that in our indust ry the
majority of home builders pay taxes at one level. That may come as
news to this committee, but generally speaking home builders are
two or three individuals Owning a corporation.
I have built homes for 30 years. I would be out of my mind to do
it any other way. So we are building homes in subchapter S corporations. Too, we are building them in partnerships that are closely
held and closely controlled, one level of tax. The public companies
that we compete with, they represent maybe 10 or 15 percent of
the total home building capacity of the country.
So, in effect, 80 to 85 percent of the revenue derived from home
building is probably singly taxed. Now we are a partnership that is
involved in that business, and I see no reason why we should inherently be classified with a couple of public corporations that are
clearly paying 'c orporate tax and require because they are paying
corporate tax because of home bu'! !!'g, that we as a partnership
should pay, whereas the partnership I am competing against,
which is closely held, is not.
In other words, there is not now a uniform playing field and
there never was.
The question now becomes: Why tax this partnership because it
has a couple of public holders? That is bad tax policy, in myopinion, and I am saying, in effect, that the threshold should not be
whether the 'Public sharehold.e-rs are involved. or not, it should. 00
just a general presumption that when you become a public partnership, at that point in time the income becomes portfolio income,

and that solves that problem. And those partnerships that want to
become public also know that is the threshold question.

In our case we would not have done it, but in the future those
who are going to do it, they will know that is one of the decisions
to be considered.
I just think it is bad policy at this point to put us in a position of
having issues shares to public unit holders after 2 years of hearings
and that we are going to put them in a position where they are
going to lose part of their investment.
The stock is dropping just because of the public disclosure of this
hearing. If there is a move to pass this kind of what I call discriminatory legislation, it is going to drop the value significantly more.
The only one that got hurt is the public. I am not going to get
hurt because we will become a private partnership the day after
the law is effective. As far as the revenue the Treasury will get,
put a line through it. We won't be there.
Mrs. KENNELLY. Partnership level withholding to ensure compliance, is there some way that we can calm the worries of Treasury
that we are going to have this hemorrhaging-is there something
we can do now?
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You have a success story. What could we look at to do to get
some revenue-we have compliance.
Mr. WILSON. With due respect to your intent, and I appreciate
what you are saying, it has been my experience that the agencies
of Government charged with the responsibility of carrying out the
congressional intent are always looking for some easy way to do
their job.
It seems to me right now that they have a problem of collecting
taxes from stockholders who have stock in street names, who have
them in corporations, who have them hidden away.
They have the problem of trying to track a dividend from those
sources and they have been working on it for a number of years by
having the reporting system on dividends and so forth.
It so happens that because of the focus of Treasury on partnerships, we are under the microscope, and I would suggest right now
that if anything is true, we probably have more of an attempt to
control that phantom that the Treasury raises than any single industry. In other words, the partnerships are probably going to do a
better job of seeing to it that the taxes are paid by its unit holders
than stockholders in corporations.
Now, if that does not work, after thirty years of appearing before
congressional committees, the one thing I know for sure is these
issues never die. If it does not work, I am sure we will be back in
24 months saying let's have a change, and I would be testifying we
didn't do the job, let's _c hange it, have withholding.
But I would think right now, having just put in a new law on
January 1 and having a hearing today without having a chance to
see if that which we did January 1 is working is really the wrong
way to J;:o about solving this problem.
I don t think that we ought to discriminate against a partnership
unit holder as opposed to a stockholder in any other corporation at
this point until we are sure that there is, in fact, a problem.
Mrs. KENNELLY. I heard almost immediately after we finished
tax reform for 1986, the buzz-if you have been around the Hill,
you know how quick the word goes. Immediately I heard that this
passive loss limit is fme and good. If you form a partnership you
can get around it and it won't hurt the real estate industry, they in
fact can adjust. How do you answer -that, because I think that is
why you have developed so quickly.
Mr. WILSON. I live in Middleburg and I operate out of Washington and I agree with you, as soon as you leave this room there will
be some discussion on how to get around whatever it is you raise.
That is the American system of business. Thank God for it. That is
what keeps us on top, and I would have to say there is nothing
wrong with that until it is abused, and when it is abused I know
the Congress knows how to take action on that, such as you did in
the real estate industry.
I supported the changes in the real estate because there was
massive abuse. I am not one that says that you start taking action
on a perceived threat before you know the threat to be real. The
problem we have right now is that everybody is right but at differ-

ent times.

The Treasury was absolutely right last l.ear. There is no doubt
that we were going to reorganize America s business into partner-
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ships, had the Congress, your committee, not taken effective action
on two very important points. Those points were the General Utilities doctrine, which clearly it makes no sense for a corporation to
pay a liquidation tax, pay another tax at the stockholder level in
order to put into a partnership.
As a matter of fact, I proposed the following theory: In some respects, if you want to balance your budget, reverse that and you
probably will balance the budget in the next 2 years because clearly it will be a massive conversion, there is no doubt. But you did
take care of that.
Unfortunately the conversations I hear are by people who listened to it last summer, not realizing that the two major changes
that you made effectively will prevent it.
As you know, there is always someone who doesn't get the word.
Having attended the hearings last year, there are an awful lot of
people who have massive conversion in their mind. They think that
the MLP income is a tremendous tax source. It is not. And they
don't realize it because they don't have the facts.
As a matter of fact, the Treasury doesn't have the facts. They
are proposing it and they don't even have the facts. Very interesting. They are saying there is a lot of money to be had on doing this
but they don't really know for sure, and when they put it together,
a good portion of that income that they are talking about is the
classification of portfolio versus passive, and I am saying to you in
advance that if that issue is resolved for the public partnerships,
and distributions is automatically classified portfolio income, then
the Treasury's numbers drop from $600 million down to maybe
$100 or $50 or Inaybe nothing-a very interesting proposition, and
they have the tools to do that.
Mrs. KENNELLY. Who has the tools to do that?
Mr. WILSON. The Treasury has the tools to do that. You gave
them broad authority, almost gave them carte blanche on qualifying partnership income as portfoliio income and not just public, but
even private partnerships, which is the proper way to go.
Mrs. KENNELLY. Thank you.
I have been dying to hear the answer to that question myself,
an
. d I a]>preciate it.
Mr. Sandler?
Mr. SANDLER. I was just about to take some issue on whether
Congress' authority was quite that broad.
I think that is somewhat debatable as to whether Treasury can
simply classify whatever it wants to as portfolio income. The issue
of whether it should be portfolio income or not is really not before
us now, although if that comes befc""e us I am sure we would have
a lot to say about it.
Mr. RosENTHAL. With respect to the questions you have asked,
the first had to do with whether or not material participation
should be a factor in determining at one level or another of Professor Lee's comments, whether or not you should have an entity
taxed as an entity or as a passthrough entity.
I think that there are a number of problems with that. First of
all, defining material participation was something that you and the
Congress had an awfully hard time with just last year. I could ask
any of the members of your committee, any of the members of the
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Senate Finance Committee, to defme that and I am not sure that
they couldMrs. KENNELLY. I am sure Mr. Dorgan could.
Mr. RosENTHAL. Maybe he could. I will bet I could disagree with
him. I don't think that that is a standard that would work.
Further, the defmition of "participation" in each and every industry is different. It is not a workable solution, and for that
reason I can't see the link to how you decide whether you tax an
entity or whether you don't.
With respect to your question on withholding, I am opposed to
that because I don't think it achieves the purpose that it is alleged
to achieve, getting more compliance. There are a number of issues
relative to compliance, one of which that is clearly important is the
complexity involved with compliance.
There are a lot of problems with taxpayer compliance in this
country, simply because they don't know·what to do with the information that they have. A lot of people think that compliance is just
the so-called underground economy where no tax is paid.
There is a problem where taxpayers just cannot process their
own tax returns. Adding withholding to a partnership K-l, which
is admittedly complicated, would not achieve any more purpose
than the problems that it would create. You would have taxpayers
deducting the taxes thinking that it is a dividend, some type of deduction that is passed through to them, others picking it up as
income because they think it is equivalent to a dividend.
Consequently, I don't think that the withholding would do a particular amount of good.
Mrs. KENNELLY. Thank vou.
Thank you all for excellent testimony and thank you very much
for coming.
The hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 1:50 p.m. the hearing was adjourned.]
[Submissions for the record follow:]

